Trinitarian Apologetics: A Case Study Involving Rob Bowman and Granville Sharp
By Greg Stafford
In their attempts to legitimize the belief that the God of the Bible is revealed
as a Triune Being, trinitarians frequently engage is conversation over verses in
the Holy Scriptures that are questionable as to whether or not they call Jesus
"God." Questionable that is, not for trinitarians, but for those who do not
accept their views. That is not to say that trinitarian scholars fail to
recognize the difficulties associated with the translation of certain scriptures
(such as Romans 9:5, for example), but it seems that even when they feel
confident in their interpretation/translation of a particular passage in which
the Hebrew or Greek terms for G-god are applied to Jesus, they nonetheless fail
to recognize the sense of the terms. In the application of Granville Sharp's
rule to several passages in the New Testament (NT), we have just such a case.
Near the end of the eighteenth century, Granville Sharp articulated what he
believed to be an indisputable rule of Greek grammar. This rule states, in
essence: When two singular nouns, adjectives, or participles of the same
grammatical case are joined by the Greek conjunction kai ("and"), if the first
noun has the article and the second one does not, then both have the same
referent. Sharp noted several exceptions to his rule, including proper names and
plurals. Since Sharp's articulation of this rule, others have excluded numerals,
generic nouns, and made other revisions to above-stated rule. But the focus of
this study is not necessarily on the legitimacy of Sharp's rule. This subject
has been treated elsewhere (see Daniel B. Wallace's "The Article with Multiple
Substantives Connected by Kai in the New Testament: Semantics and Significance"
[Ph.D. dissertation: Dallas Theological Seminary, 1995]; and my book Jehovah's
Witnesses Defended: An Answer to Scholars and Critics [Huntington Beach, CA:
Elihu Books, 1998], pages 221-248) and I plan on treating it further in a
chapter called, "NWT, the Greek Article, and Christ's Deity," which is part of a
multi-authored book that will be released sometime next year. However, recently
Robert M. Bowman, Jr., author of several books, three of which focus on the
beliefs and literature of Jehovah's Witnesses, revised an online article he
wrote regarding Granville Sharp's rule. The title of this article is "Sharp's
Rule and Antitrinitarian Theologies: A Bicentennial Defense of Granville Sharp's
Argument for the Deity of Christ," Revised May 25, 1998.
In this article Bowman tries to prove that Granville Sharp's first rule
(summarized above) is legitimate, and should be applied to Titus 2:13 and 2
Peter 1:1, the result being that Jesus is called "the great God" as well as
simply "God." He also attempts to discredit my Excursus on Sharp's rule, but in
the process he has made several serious errors. After reading through his
article I pointed out a key error Bowman had made in relation to my book, and he
offered a public acknowledgement that he had misused my conclusions. However,
there are additional errors in Bowman's article that will serve as an extremely
important study designed to help trinitarians realize a serious problem with
their attempts to find the doctrine of the Trinity in the text of Scripture.
This problem has to do with sense and reference. As I mentioned before,
trinitarians think they have succeeded in finding something commensurate with
their belief when they find a passage that refers to Jesus with the Greek or
Hebrew terms for G-god. It is not at all uncommon to hear them exclaim, "Jesus
is God!" But do the references they point to, or even the aforementioned
confession, support their understanding of God?
The second edition of my book Jehovah's Witnesses Defended will be available
early next year, and in the second introduction I will comment on this matter
involving sense relations, but at this time we will use Bowman's article on G.
Sharp (hereafter referred to as Bowman-Sharp, page(s) ???) to illustrate the
limitations of his article on this matter of sense and reference, and in the
process we will also consider his arguments against my Excursus. When quoting
Bowman-Sharp, I will reference the headings of each section in his article
followed by the relevant comments I wish to discuss. My comments will be
prefaced with Stafford-Response.
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Bowman-Sharp, page 5
A. Defining Sharp's Rule
. . . (3) Sharp's rule governs personal nouns, but not proper names. This
distinction is critical, and often not understood. By "personal nouns" is meant
nouns which are used to refer to persons, but which are not proper names.
Personal nouns are words such as "king," "savior," "prophet," "teacher," and
"brother." Proper names are words such as "Jesus," "Peter," "Paul," and "John."
A few nouns, such as "God" and "Christ," can sometimes function as proper names,
while at other times function as personal nouns; more will be said on this
matter later in this study. The reason why the rule does not apply to proper
names is that they refer by definition to unique individuals, so that definite
articles are not needed to make their referents distinct. Sharp himself was
careful to exclude both plural nouns and proper names from his rule."
Stafford-Response
It is true, of course, that proper names refer to unique individuals, but often
descriptive phrases are more unique in terms of providing a definite reference
to a particular individual. In fact, proper names are just as context-dependent
as noun-phrases. John Lyons, Linguistic Semantics: An Introduction (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), page 301, gives the example of "Margaret
Thatcher," a name that is not unique to one individual in Great Britain, but
there is only one person who would have had the name "Margaret Thatcher" with
the descriptive content of "the first woman Prime Minister of Great Britain." In
fact, the descriptive phrase "the first woman Prime Minister of Great Britain"
is more restrictive in its application than "Margaret Thatcher." It is important
that we keep this in mind as we consider Bowman's attempts to deal with the
proper name equivalents in Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1.
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Bowman-Sharp, pages 6, 7
C. Alleged Counterexamples
. . . Proverbs 24:21 . . . There are at least three good explanations why this
text is not a counterexample to Sharp's rule.
First, it may be that "God" is here treated as a proper name. This is, in fact,
the most probable explanation. Strangely, in his recent detailed study of
Sharp's rule Greg Stafford (a Jehovah's Witness) considers some four or five
explanations for this text but does not consider this simplest explanation.
Stafford-Response
Of course, I did indeed consider this. I stated: "Still, it [Prov. 24:21]does
stand as an exception, probably for the reason Kuehne gives, namely, there was
no reason to repeat the article, as the identity of God and the `king' in the
LXX of Proverbs 24:21 was not dependent on the use of the article, but on the
prima facie meaning of the text in its context." (Jehovah's Witnesses Defended,
page 226) In stating the above I am making it clear that "God" could be viewed
as a term that the readers/translators of the LXX understood as a clear
reference to Jehovah, as distinct from the "king," in this context. It need not
be viewed as a proper name per se for a noun to have such a restrictive force
(see below for more on the issue of "God" as a proper name). For example, the
word "President" is not a proper name, but if I used it in a context concerning
the current commander-in-chief of the United States, what person would come to
mind? Thus, certain descriptive terms, depending on the context in which they
are used, have the restrictive force of a proper name, in that they create
concepts in the minds of those individuals who use such terms that can only be
understood of a particular individual. That is what I meant when I referred to
"the prima facie meaning of the text in its context."
I wrote my Excursus in 1996, and at that time I was following Wallace's
observation that proper names could not be pluralized (see, Wallace, "Multiple
Substantives," pages 260-263). However, at no time did I mean to imply that such
terms could not be viewed as having the restrictive force of a proper name. As I
have stated on B-Greek several times during this past year, "God" could indeed
be viewed as having the restrictive force of a proper name, though I am more
prepared to view it as such when it is used with other, more defining terms
(such as "true," "only," or "great"). For example, which is more restrictive in
its application, "President," or "the President of the United States"? Of
course, the context could grant each term basically the same restrictive force.
That is to say, in certain contexts we might invariably understand "the
President of the United States," even if the only term used is "President." In
the same vein, "God," in the context of the Bible, can have one of several
different referents, all with different senses. But if we read the term "God" in
a context where, say, Abraham is praying, then we would likely understand the
term to refer to Jehovah, Abraham's God. But in the same context we might read
about "Jehovah God," or "Almighty God," or the "Most High God," and the same
referent would come to mind, with the same sense. Knowing that Jehovah is spoken
of as "Almighty," the "Most High," etc., allows those who know Him as such to
associate these same concepts with Him even when He is simply referred to as
"God." It is similar with others whom the Bible calls G-god, as will be seen
below.
Bowman-Sharp, page 7
Second, the Greek translation here may reflect an overly literal rendering of
the Hebrew text (Sharp's rule does not apply to Hebrew). To this explanation
Stafford has objected that the Septuagint, in Proverbs as well as elsewhere,
frequently departed from the Hebrew. Although Stafford is right about this
general observation, it does not militate against the explanation. While the
Septuagint frequently departs from the Hebrew, it does not do so always.
Stafford-Response
I do not recall saying that the LXX "always" departs from the Hebrew. My point
was simply that the LXX does indeed depart from the Hebrew, even in the
immediate context (see Jehovah's Witnesses Defended, page 224-226, especially
note 21 on page 226). Thus, the LXX translators were not bound to follow the
Hebrew literally, and that is my point. It is a valid observation in this
context, even though Bowman has tried his best to reword it.
Bowman-Sharp, page 7
The fact that in the Septuagint "God" is used as a substitute for "Yahweh" adds
further confirmation that "God" is here used as a proper name.
Stafford-Response
"God" may very well be used with the force of a proper name. But our primary
concern is not with the defined term, but the anarthrous term, "king." Having a
proper name in the first position does not necessarily explain why the second
term is anarthrous in a kai-joined phrase (see below).
Bowman-Sharp, page 7
Third, the text makes it grammatically unambiguous that two persons is [sic]
meant in the second half of the verse: "Fear God, [my] son, and [the] king, and
disobey neither of them [Greek, meth' heterô autôn]." Since the plural pronoun
"them" (autôn) here must have as its antecedent two or more persons, the
sentence as a whole makes it grammatically unambiguous that "God" and "king"
refer to two distinct persons.
Stafford-Response
Yes, that is quite clear, but we are still left with resolving the LXX's use of
an article-noun-kai-noun phrase in such a grammatically obvious situation, if
the LXX translators understood the GS rule to be legitimate. This, coupled with
the fact that the LXX translators were hardly bound to follow the Hebrew
literally, shows that they did not consider Sharp's rule valid. The issue in
this text appears to be the nouns and their context. These considerations should
be considered in all article-noun-kai-noun constructions.
Bowman-Sharp, page 7
This text, then, cannot stand as a counterexample to Sharp's rule, despite
claims to the contrary.
Stafford-Response
It will continue to serve as an exception, for Bowman has yet to account for the
fact that the article is missing, not before "God," but before "king." There are
reasons for removing this example from the pale of Sharp's rule, because the two
nouns contextually must refer to two distinct persons, but, as Bowman suggests,
"God" in the first instance may also serve as the equivalent of a proper name.
It is similar with regard to the christologically significant texts in NT, as we
shall see. So, this illustrates my point: We must not simply look for the
pattern article-noun-kai-noun and rest our case; rather, we should consider the
context, and determine if one or both of the terms are used with special
significance, that is, are they regularly restricted by their users to certain
individuals? There are also the grammatical considerations in the context, as
Bowman highlighted in the case of Proverbs 24:21, but these do not always aid
us. For example, in 2 Peter 1:2 we have "God" used with the proper name "Jesus,"
where the two are understood (in everyone's view) as distinct individuals. But
the context uses the singular pronoun autou ("of him") in verse 3, as if only
one person were in view. All factors need to be equally considered, especially
the presupposition pool of the author and those to whom he or she is writing
(see below).
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Bowman-Sharp, page 8
Martyrdom of Polycarp 22:1. . . . For Sharp's rule to be inapplicable it is
necessary only that one of the two nouns joined by kai be a proper name. Thus,
even if "God the Father" was not being used in Polycarp as a proper name,
Sharp's rule would not apply because of the use of "Holy Spirit" as such.
Stafford-Response
This qualification is not accurate at all. In the phrase "God the Father"
(Greek: ho theos kai pater), how can it be said that neither of these two nouns
carry the restrictive force of a proper name in NT, in the particular contexts
in which they are used? Yet this phrase constitutes the bulk of examples in NT
that are supposed to validate Sharp's rule! In fact, see page 6(B.), par. 1 in
Bowman's article, where he highlights this expression as validating Sharp's
rule. What we are concerned with is this: Why is the second noun anarthrous (=
without the article) in an article-noun-kai-noun construction? Is there
something about the noun that allows for it to be used without the article, but
not as a further description of the individual or entity denoted by the first
noun? This is where all the exceptions to Sharp's rule come in, because there is
something about plural nouns, generic nouns, numerals, etc., that accounts for
the missing article. If the anarthrous noun is part of a compound proper name,
or is a noun that has the restrictive force of a proper name, then we can
similarly account for the missing article. We must also consider the context,
the habitual use of language of the author in question, as well as other
significant factors relating to the proper understanding of the passage.
Bowman-Sharp, pages 8, 9
One other thing about this passage in Polycarp should be observed. In context
Polycarp is being quoted as speaking of giving glory "to Jesus Christ," along
with the Father and Holy Spirit. Given that this is the context, there really
can be no doubt but that Polycarp is referring to the Holy Spirit as customarily
distinguished from the Father (as well as from the Son, Jesus Christ).
Stafford-Response
Well, this begs the question as to whether Polycarp is identifying the Father as
the Holy Spirit. But, again, I agree with Bowman that the context must be
considered in this example, though I think Bowman conveniently neglects the
context, both immediate and larger, when it comes to the christologically
significant passages in NT. Instead, he reads them through the eyeglasses of
later trinitarian theology (see below).
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Bowman-Sharp, page 9
Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus 3:12 . . . Here we would frankly suggest that
one as yet unstated qualification to Sharp's rule be recognized. Where the two
nouns are semantically related as normally descriptive of two persons in an
immediately recognizable relationship, Sharp's rule does not apply.
Stafford-Response
First, the use of "only" together with Father could hardly be more restrictive!
Second, Bowman begs the question as to whether or not one personality used the
different modes of "Father" and "Son" in order to accomplish His purpose. Bowman
would have to appeal to Clement's larger theological context to negate such a
view, for as it stands his suggestion is circular: He assumes that Clement does
not believe the same person that is the Father is also the Son, and thereby
creates a qualification for Sharp's rule in order to support his conclusion. In
order to dispose of this argument Bowman would have to appeal to the theology of
the author, which is what I did with his approval:
Bowman-Sharp, page 9
Stafford rightly objects to this theory, since there is no other evidence of
modalistic language in either writing.
Stafford-Response
But when it comes to the key NT texts we are primarily concerned with (Titus
2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1), Bowman does not seem as determined to involve the
author's theology (see below).
Bowman-Sharp, page 9
Finally, something should be said about the explanation favored by Stafford for
all of the exceptions considered here (other than Matthew 21:12, which involves
plural nouns). Stafford seizes on Kuehne's explanation of the apparent exception
in Proverbs 24:21 LXX that "the two nouns, 'God' and 'king,' are so distinct
that no confusion could possibly have arisen through the omission of the second
article." Oddly, at first Stafford says that this explanation "is not entirely
convincing" because in Psalms (though not in Proverbs) God is called "king" some
twenty times. But then he decides that this explanation is really best after
all, because it provides a basis for him to deny that the rule applies in the
debated christological texts.
Stafford-Response
That is not my reason at all. Rather, I considered the different explanations
and, in the end, deemed Kuehne's suggestion to be the most adequate.
Bowman-Sharp, page 9
Stafford generalizes Kuehne's explanation into a principle that Sharp's rule
does not apply in any text where the persons to which two nouns refer are
understood to be two different persons.
Stafford-Response
Well, is that not precisely why proper names are excluded from the pale of
Sharp's rule? If the terms involved are understood by the author and his
readers/hearers to refer to specific persons, and if those terms are generally
or always restricted to that person, then it is only natural to associate the
terms with their commonly understood referent, just as you attempt to do with
the example from The Martyrdom of Polycarp. You argue that "Holy Spirit" is used
as a proper name because of its frequent use for one of the "divine persons."
The same is true for any term that is restricted by its use to a particular
person, context permitting.
Bowman-Sharp, pages 9, 10
Although Stafford is correct in observing that Kuehne and others have used this
principle to explain (away) apparent exceptions to Sharp's rule, the evidence we
have provided undermines the legitimacy of Stafford's principle. In no text
considered here is it necessary to appeal to theological preunderstandings in
order to know what is meant. In Proverbs 24:21 LXX, for example, we saw that the
text is grammatically unambiguous that two persons are meant because the two
nouns "God" and "king" are antecedents for the plural pronoun "them."
Stafford-Response
This does not explain why the article is not repeated before "king," if the LXX
translator considered Sharp's rule valid. You have proven nothing about the key
issue. You have simply told us what we already know, but have failed to deal
with the issue under consideration: Why did the LXX translators not repeat the
article if he/they understood that article-noun-kai-noun constructions always
applied to one person? If it is because the context makes the distinction
evident, then the context should be the determining factor, or at least one of
them, in properly interpreting such passages. But this is not stressed by those
who advocate one-person translations for Titus 2:13 or 2 Peter 1:1.
Bowman-Sharp, page 10
Besides, one may not legitimately assume that a particular theological
distinction would be clear to Paul's readers no more than about thirty years
after Christ's death and resurrection.
Stafford-Response
But one may not legitimately assume that such a distinction would not be clear
to Paul's readers. We can establish from the author's use of language what
particular theology the author is intent on communicating.
Bowman-Sharp, page 10
It is true that in cases in which proper names (such as "Barnabas" or "Holy
Spirit") or "paired" nouns (such as "Father and Son") are used in the
construction, there is no possibility of any of these noun pairs referring to a
single person. But that is not on the basis of a general principle that readers
may be trusted to recognize when two persons are meant, but on the basis of
objective semantical factors. It is, in fact, arguing in a circle to conclude
that Paul or Peter was referring to two persons rather than one because their
readers would already know that Christ was a separate being from God.
Stafford-Response
If the author under consideration makes it clear time and again that the two are
indeed separate beings, then it is certainly legitimate to think that their
meaning was readily understood by those who read his writings, and shared his
presuppositions. If certain nouns or descriptions are regularly restricted to
one person, then it is legitimate to view them as having the force of a proper
name in a context where the particular person to whom the descriptions are
regularly given is the subject. It is only from the perspective of later
centuries that the trinitarian view is at home in the texts under consideration,
but in the Bible one cannot avoid the clear and repeated distinction made
between God and Jesus. So it is not arguing in a circle at all, but merely
pointing out the facts as communicated unambiguously throughout Scripture,
particularly in the writings of Paul and Peter, for the former held that the
"one God" is the Father (1 Cor. 8:6) while the latter understood this One to be
"the God and Father" of Jesus Christ. (1 Pet. 1:3). Thus, at most, theos could
be applied to Jesus with a different sense, but they could not be considered the
same theos. This is the fundamental problem with reading the Trinity back into
the Bible. The argument we have put forth is that the theology of the author is
a factor to consider in translating these passages, and it points away from a
trinitarian-preferred translation of the Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1. But the
theology of the Bible writers, in particular Paul and Peter, gives absolutely no
support for a trinitarian understanding of these texts. That is to say,
regardless of how these verses are translated, the sense of the term theos is
not commensurate with the trinitarian concept of God.
Bowman-Sharp, page 10
It is also begging the question to reason that because elsewhere in Titus or 2
Peter the author distinguishes Jesus Christ from "God," his readers will
understand that he is not then identifying Jesus Christ as "God" in texts
exhibiting Sharp's construction. The cornerstone of orthodox, trinitarian
theology is precisely this phenomenon of Scripture in which the Son Jesus Christ
is both distinguished from God and identified as God (as in John 1:1b-c; Heb.
1:8-9).
Stafford-Response
I make the same observation in my book: Jesus could be called theos in Titus and
2 Peter, even though he is not called theos anywhere else in either of these two
letters. But the habitual use of language by each author does make it highly
unlikely. However, trinitarian theology is at loggerheads with the biblical
distinction between God and Christ, for nowhere does the Bible use the terms
"God," "person" and others with the meaning that trinitarians pour into them. As
we have previously discussed, it is not correct for Bowman to say, "Jesus Christ
is both distinguished from God and identified as God," for he really means
"Jesus is distinguished from God the Father and is God the Son, the second
person of a consubstantial Triad." But he will not use this language when
referring to Scripture, because no Bible text says what he does! Instead, he
tries to cleverly disguise references to Jesus as theos in a manner consistent
with the later doctrine of the Trinity. But, remember, "God" to trinitarians can
only be one, and that "one" is a consubstantial Triad. Bowman does not believe
that Jesus is the totality of the Triad, and so he uses the term "God" in a
self-serving manner that contradicts his own understanding of God, unless he
provides the necessary qualification.
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Bowman-Sharp, page 10, 11
D. Abuses of Sharp's Rule . . . Jesus as God the Father. . . . Among the many
passages of Scripture which distinguish between the Father and the Son as two
persons and so contradict Oneness doctrine are the salutations in the New
Testament epistles, the most common form of which runs as follows: "Grace to you
and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ" (Rom. 1:7; 1 Cor. 1:3;
2 Cor. 1:2; Gal. 1:3; Eph. 1:2; Phil. 1:2; 2 Thess. 1:2; Philemon 3; see also
Eph. 6:23; 1 Thess. 1:1; 2 Thess. 1:1; 1 Tim. 1:1, 2; 2 Tim. 1:2; Tit. 1:4;
James 1:1; 2 Pet. 1:2; 2 John 3).
Stafford-Response
Here we see Bowman using the term "person" in manner consistent with
post-biblical theology. In the Bible, different "persons" are different beings
and so there is no support for the belief that Jesus is the same God as the
Father, for the Father is the God of the Son, and is regularly distinguished
from him, as such.
Bowman-Sharp, page 11
Particularly devastating to the Oneness understanding of the salutations is 2
John 3, which speaks of blessings "from God the Father and from Jesus Christ the
Son of the Father" (para theou patros kai para Iêsou christou tou huiou tou
patros). The unusual feature of this salutation is that the word "from" (para)
is repeated before "Jesus Christ." One Oneness writer claimed that none of the
salutations did this, recognizing that if they did it would imply two persons;
but he makes no mention of this text. Also striking is that the first person,
"God," is described as "the Father," while the second person, "Jesus Christ," is
called "the Son of the Father"; the language of Father and Son here as elsewhere
clearly denotes two persons.
Stafford-Response
Again, the language to which Bowman refers is just as "devastating" to his view
as to the Oneness view, for the Bible nowhere articulates the distinction
between "persons" and "beings" that trinitarians do. Rather, it simply refers to
the Father and Son, as we commonly do, namely, as denoting two separate beings.
Bowman-Sharp, page 13
Stafford argues that if Sharp's (first) rule were correct we would expect John
20:28 to refer to two persons because the article appears before kurios and
theos. But the application of both nouns to Jesus is made explicit grammatically
by the introduction of Thomas's cry as directed to one person, "to him" (autô),
i.e., Jesus (v. 28a).
Stafford-Response
First, Bowman fails to recognize that an exclamation need not be intended for
the person to whom it is spoken. In John 21:7 John speaks to Peter (legei tw
Petrw) about Jesus (ho kyrios estin, "It is the Lord!") Obviously, in the case
of John 20:28, the exclamation is going to be directed to the person before
Thomas, but whether or not his doxology was meant for both the one who was
resurrected and the One who resurrected him is not stated. Greek scholar G. B.
Winer points out:
Jo. xx. 28 [John 20:28], however, though directed to Jesus (eipen autw), is yet
rather an exclamation than an address; . . . such nominatives appear early and
very distinctly in Greek writers.--G. B. Winer, A Treatise on the Grammar of the
New Testament in Greek Regarded as the Basis of New Testament Exegesis, 6th
edition, trans. W. F. Moulton (Edingburgh: T & T Clark, 1885), page 228.
The context also helps us appreciate that the two nouns were likely intended for
different referents. (John 20:17) There are other issues surrounding this verse
that should also be considered. See my book for details.
Bowman-Sharp, page 13
Likewise, Stafford later cites other texts where two or three nouns are linked
by kai and each has the article, yet all refer to one subject (John 13:13; Rev.
1:5; Matt. 22:32, cf. Luke 20:37), as counterevidence against Sharp's rule. He
reasons that these examples show that the addition of a second definite article
in front of the second noun in Titus 2:13 or 2 Peter 1:1 would not "have made it
clear that two persons are in view" (ibid., 247). But this does not follow,
since in his example texts the singularity of the subject is made grammatically
explicit.
Stafford-Response
Greek writers had a variety of ways to express their thoughts. If they had
understood that the repetition of the article denoted different subjects, then
they would not have written the above texts the way they did. But that they did
supports the view that the context was the determining factor, not the use or
non-use of the article. In fact, the above texts are shown to be grammatically
explicit in the context. But there are other contextual factors that should be
equally considered in interpretation. Bowman neglects key contextual factors. My
whole point is that the grammar of the phrases themselves do not clinch the
argument, and Bowman is only further supporting that observation, though he does
so rather selectively. Also, in the section of my book to which Bowman refers, I
am responding directly to a frequently used argument concerning the repetition
of the article, so Bowman's point is misplaced.
Bowman-Sharp, page 13
F. Reasons for Scholarly Doubts about Sharp's Rule . . . it is sometimes claimed
(particularly by the Jehovah's Witnesses) that the belief that the Bible teaches
the deity of Christ is based on an uncritical acceptance of the KJV.
Stafford-Response
No, it is the uncritical acceptance of any Bible that translates passages
without proper attention to sense.
Bowman-Sharp, page 13, 14
Another reason for the reluctance of scholars to endorse Sharp's rule fully is
the influence of the nineteenth-century Greek grammarian G. B. Winer. Over sixty
years ago A. T. Robertson lamented Winer's influence in this matter. After
noting Winer's "anti-Trinitarian prejudice" and carefully examining Winer's
arguments concerning Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1, Robertson concluded:
It is plain, therefore, that Winer has exerted a pernicious influence, from the
grammatical standpoint, on the interpretation of 2 Pet. 1:1 and Tit. 2:13.
Scholars who believed in the Deity of Christ have not wished to claim too much
and to fly in the face of Winer, the great grammarian, for three generations.
But Winer did not make out a sound case against Sharp's principle as applied to
2 Pet. 1:1 and Tit. 2:13. Sharp stands vindicated after all the dust has
settled. We must let these passages mean what they want to mean regardless of
our theories about the theology of the writers.
Stafford-Response
And here we find Bowman and Robertson failing to grasp the significance of
theological considerations when interpreting the grammar of the Greek NT. Winer,
understanding that grammar alone is not the sole criterion by which the meaning
of a passage should be gathered, was honest enough to admit the truth about the
relationship between God and Christ, in the Bible, particularly in Titus 2:13
and 2 Peter 1:1. Also, Winer did not rule out a one-person translation of the
aforementioned texts. His comments are balanced and deserve careful
consideration.
Bowman-Sharp, page 14
II. Sharp's Rule and Proper Names . . . A. When Is "God" a Proper Name? In
general, there are no inflexible rules for determining when "God" is being used
as a proper name rather than as a personal noun. However, there is a rule of
thumb that can be used frequently to determine that it is not being used as a
proper name. Whenever "God" is qualified by some adjectival word or phrase, it
is being used as a personal noun, not as a proper name.
Stafford-Response
At this point, Bowman has self-servingly invented a rule that is not at all
accurate, as we discussed earlier. When descriptive terms are used with
modifying expressions that further restrict their application, they function as
proper names more so than when used alone. Bowman continues:
Bowman-Sharp, page 14
For example, we do not normally use adjectives with proper names in English.
When we do - for instance, "Ivan the Terrible" or "my Bill" - it is generally to
distinguish the persons named from other persons bearing the same name. In these
cases, though, the noun in question is one that is never used as a common
personal noun. That is, "Ivan" and "Bill" are unambiguously proper names
regardless of the context, whereas "God" can be used as a proper name or a
personal noun depending on context. Thus, such expressions as "my God," "our
God," "the true God," "the living God," "the Almighty God," "the God of
Abraham," and so forth, without a doubt are using "God" as a personal noun.
Stafford-Response
To what other being could the description "the true God" apply? According to
Jesus, only one! (John 17:3) That is just as restrictive as a proper name. How
about "the God of Abraham"? There is only one person to whom such a description
could apply. Thus, both descriptions are used with the restrictive force of a
proper name. From a (biblical) Jewish or Christian perspective, "the living God"
and "the Almighty God" are just as restrictive. All of the above expressions are
more restrictive than when "God" is used alone, even though in certain contexts
"God" can function with roughly the same restrictive force as the more
restrictive descriptions.
Bowman-Sharp, pages 14, 15
Greg Stafford takes a somewhat different approach to the question of the use of
theos as a proper name. In his view "there are problems with seeing theos, by
itself, as the equivalent of a proper name," but when it is used with
"accompanying terms" that make it refer unambiguously to a specific person that
full expression then has the force of a proper name. Stafford's main example is
"God the Father" (theos ho patêr), in which the qualifying expression "the
Father" restricts the term "God" to a specific person. But this example is
really not inconsistent with my saying that "God" with an adjectival expression
should be viewed as using "God" as a personal noun, since "Father" is a noun,
not an adjective. Likewise, other compound names such as "Lord Jesus Christ" or
"Christ Jesus" may rightly be regarded as proper names.
Stafford-Response
I never said it was inconsistent with Bowman's statement concerning "God" when
used with accompanying adjectives, but I am saying that Bowman's view is
unfounded. To be honest, it seems like he is just making this up as he goes.
Bowman-Sharp, page 15, note 38
As evidence that theos alone does not function as a proper name, Stafford refers
in this footnote [page 235, note 52] to the textually uncertain 2 Thessalonians
2:16, which speaks of "our Lord Jesus Christ and God our Father" (ho kurios
hêmôn Iêsous Christos kai [ho] theos ho patêr hêmôn). I do not see how a text
that does not have theos standing alone can be cited as evidence about its usage
when standing alone!
Stafford-Response
That is because Bowman apparently does not understand that "God" is used apart
from "the Father of us." The description, "the Father of us" is in apposition to
"God"; it is not used as a compound title (i.e., "God the Father"). How could it
be in view of hemwn (= "of us")? In the case of both nouns ("Lord" and "God"),
however, the restrictive force of "Jesus Christ" and "the Father" make the
application of each noun specific. But if theos were considered a proper name by
the scribe who wrote ho theos, why would he insert the article? The position of
an articular theos (following kai) in this construction seems unnecessary if the
use of theos by itself were considered a the equivalent to a proper name, for it
is here specifically identified as a reference to the Father. Therefore, if the
article is used when the reference is specific (though it does not function as a
compound description), it calls into question the restrictive force of the noun
when it is used apart from additional expressions such as "the Father." Theos
alone can still be used with the force of a proper name, but the case is not so
clear as when it is used with other, more descriptive terms.
Bowman-Sharp, page 15, note 38
As indicated, some manuscripts have the definite article before theos and others
do not. Stafford reasons, "If ho theos is the true reading, it is difficult to
understand its articularity, being in the second position, if indeed theos is
here the equivalent of a proper name." Here Stafford betrays a misunderstanding
of Sharp's rule. The reverse of the qualification regarding proper names and
Sharp's (first) rule is not itself a rule: that is, if two nouns are joined by
kai and either or both of them is a proper name, they might still both have the
definite article.
Stafford-Response
But Bowman here assumes that "God" used by itself is a proper name! Bowman has
to account for the articularity of the first noun and the fact that the article
is not repeated before the second term. Taking the first part of this verse as a
proper name does not explain why some manuscripts have the article before the
second noun. That is what I am trying to do. Proper names do not need articles
to make them specific. That is why I discounted theos as a proper name in this
instance. Bowman is not keeping with the context of my discussion. So, really,
it is Bowman who does not understand the point at hand. Proper names, especially
when they follow kai, do not need the article to make them specific. But Bowman
has not proven that theos by itself is a proper name. I am not in complete
disagreement with him on this point, but he surely misunderstood my analysis.
Bowman-Sharp, page 15, note 38
Thus, there would be nothing grammatically odd about the text if ho theos were
the true reading and at the same time was using theos as a proper name.
Stafford-Response
Yes, there would. Why would a proper name following kai have an article before
it? I suppose it could, but it does not need it, and that is what I am positing.
You take my suggestion and make into some dogmatic "rule." This is not the first
or the last time this has happened (see below regarding "the great God").
Bowman-Sharp, page 15, 16
B. Dubious Applications of Sharp's Rule to Christological Texts . . .
"of the Christ and God" (Eph. 5:5)
tou Christou kai theou
"of our God and Lord Jesus Christ" (2 Thess. 1:12)
tou theou hêmôn kai kuriou Iêsou Christou
"of the God and Christ Jesus" (1 Tim. 5:21; 2 Tim. 4:1)
tou theou kai Christou Iêsou
"of the God who makes all things alive and Christ Jesus" (1 Tim. 6:13).
tou theou tou zôogonountos ta panta kai Christou Iêsou
. . . It is at this point that realizing that "God" can be used as a proper name
is relevant. Four of these five texts have "God" standing without any adjectival
modifiers at all; thus, it is possible that in these four cases "God" is used as
a proper name.
Stafford-Response
Keep in mind, Bowman has nowhere provided support for his view that when "God"
is used with adjectival modifiers it is no longer used as a proper name. The
reason for his qualification will be evident when we consider Titus 2:13.
Bowman-Sharp, page 16
The exception is 2 Thessalonians 1:12, where the text has "our God." And it is
just barely possible that "Lord" is to be taken with "our God" as a second
personal noun, so that the text is understood, "of our-God-and-Lord, Jesus
Christ." However, the noun phrase "Lord Jesus Christ" had become so familiar a
compound name for Jesus that the entire expression could be used as one proper
name. In Paul's writings alone the compound name "Lord Jesus Christ" appears
some 18 times and the name "our Lord Jesus Christ" some 25 times.
Stafford-Response
Strange that Bowman nowhere references Wallace, Middleton, or my book, since
these observations regarding "Lord Jesus Christ" were made prior to his article.
Also, he fails to understand the significance of the use of a proper name (!) as
part of the expression "Lord Jesus Christ." It is the use of the name,
regardless of what title comes with it, that makes the reference definite.
Nowhere does Bowman comment on this point, which I made in my book (see below).
Bowman-Sharp, page 16, 17
C. Proper Names in Titus 2:13 or 2 Peter 1:1? . . .1. Is "the Great God" a
Proper Name? . . . There are severe deficiencies in Stafford's argument for the
expression "the great God" in Titus as a proper name for the Father (or for
Yahweh).
Stafford-Response
First, it should be clearly understood that I do not view the expression as a
proper name, but the equivalent of a proper name, having basically the same
restrictive force. Actually, such expressions may even be more restrictive than
an actual proper name (see my introductory comments at the beginning of this
article).
Bowman-Sharp, page 17
1. This expression is actually rare even in the texts Stafford cites; we should
properly include only four texts (Neh. 8:6; Ps. 85:10; Dan. 2:45; 9:4). In other
texts the word "great" is attached to "God" but as part of a more elaborate
description. Psalm 76:14 LXX should not be included at all, since theos megas
does not mean "great God" but is rather asking rhetorically what "god" is great
like our God!
Stafford-Response
No, they are all appropriate references for they show that the term "God" was
frequently associated with the description "great," when used of Jehovah, and
even negatively of those gods who rival Jah. (Ps. 76:14) Thus, Psalm 76:14 is
very relevant, for it shows that no other god is "great" like Jah. This shows
that the terms were guarded and secured for Jehovah alone. This is stated
explicitly in Psalm 85:10, su ei ho theos monos ho megas.
Bowman-Sharp, page 17
2. In all of the texts cited by Stafford here, not one uses the expression "the
great God" as a proper name. That is, in each case we are dealing with a
description praising God in worship or commending God's greatness to others, not
a designation serving as a proper name.
Stafford-Response
Bowman is here asserting something that he has not even begun to prove. For
readers of the LXX, like Paul, to run across an expression like "the great God,"
or "the God who is great," etc., particularly when it is said, "You alone are
the great God" (Ps. 85:10) this would certainly restrict the application of "the
great God" to serve as description that was reserved for Jehovah alone. Bowman
is reduced to shear desperation at this point.
Bowman-Sharp, page 17
In many of these texts there is a noun functioning as a proper name, but it is
"Lord" (kurios), substituting for the Hebrew divine name Yahweh.
Stafford-Response
First, this is only the case 5 times, and the Psalm references do not have
"Lord" used with "God." But it does not make any difference. My point is simply
this: The LXX Bible provided Paul with a description of God that is reserved for
him alone.
Bowman-Sharp, pages 17, 18
Even where the name "Lord" is not in the immediate context, not once does "the
great God" carry the force of a proper name.
Stafford-Response
Bowman is just making things up again. He is also begging the question. The fact
that the Bible makes it clear that Jehovah alone is "the great God," points to
the fact that this is a description that is restricted in its usage to Jehovah,
and thus carries the restrictive force of a proper name.
Bowman-Sharp, page 18
The only text where such a usage is even arguable is Daniel 2:45. It is almost
certainly not used as a proper name even there, since in context Daniel is
speaking to Nebuchadnezzar, a pagan king who was not likely to have regarded
"the great God" as a proper name for Yahweh.
Stafford-Response
This is truly a lame argument. I refer the reader to the author index in my book
and ask that you look up all the references to Bowman, and you will see that
this type of argumentation is not infrequent in his writings, unfortunately.
Don't get me wrong, I am sure Bowman is a nice guy (he told me so himself!), but
the type of arguments he uses are sometimes very difficult to appreciate.
Regarding the above, how does the fact that Daniel is speaking to Nebuchadnezzar
remove Daniel's reference from being a proper name equivalent? Daniel knows what
terms are commonly used of his God, and he used them.
Bowman-Sharp, page 18
3. Examples of this "proper name" appearing in Paul's writings, or even the New
Testament, are conspicuously absent from Stafford's discussion.
Stafford-Response
And this proves what?
Bowman-Sharp, page 18
There is a simple reason for this: Titus 2:13 is the only New Testament text
using the expression "great God." Indeed, except for Titus 2:13 God is never
called "great" (megas) in the New Testament, even though the word appears in the
New Testament nearly 200 times. It is therefore extremely unlikely that anyone
would construe "the great God" in the New Testament as a proper name.
Stafford-Response
This is simply ridiculous. A term need not be used numerous times in a body of
literature in order to be considered a proper name. In this instance, Paul, one
who was thoroughly familiar with the LXX, used a phrase in a particular context
dealing with the fulfillment of end-time hopes. We need not expect that he would
use this description too often.
Bowman-Sharp, page 18
When these considerations are taken together with the presumption that the noun
"God" modified by an adjective such as "great" is likely being used as a
personal noun, the only reasonable conclusion is that "the great God" in Titus
2:13 is not functioning as a proper name.
Stafford-Response
What is truly remarkable is that, in spite of what he says above, consider what
Bowman states later regarding this matter:
Bowman-Sharp, page 30
Actually, Stafford is on to something about the expression "the great God." It
is undeniably true that the Old Testament knows no other "great God" than
Jehovah. We may go further and agree that an informed reader encountering the
reference to "the great God" in Titus 2:13 would surely understand this as a
reference to Jehovah. Again, this understanding of the reference of "the great
God" does not turn the expression into a proper name. (We must not confuse an
expression's referential significance with its grammatical significance. For
instance, the expression "the sixteenth President of the United States" has the
referential significance of identifying the subject as Abraham Lincoln; but this
does not give the expression the grammatical significance of a proper name.)
Stafford-Response
This is a critical point. Bowman has terribly misunderstood my point. In
stating, "In light of the OT description of Jehovah as `the great God' it is
equally possible, if not more likely, that `the great God' was understood as the
equivalent of a proper name," I was not suggesting anything other than that this
description carried the restrictive force of a proper name! In Bowman's example,
who else could be so described but Abraham Lincoln? Thus, it is restrictive and
every time it is used in a sentence about the US Government, the only person
that would come to mind is Lincoln. It is unfortunate that Bowman has so hastily
attempted to respond to my book. He should have giving more thought to his
arguments, or at least waited until he understood mine better. The result:
Confusion. People who are not familiar with these issues will think that I said
this or that, when the facts are quite different. Bowman continued:
Bowman-Sharp, page 18
2. Is "Our Savior Jesus Christ" a Proper Name?
If anything the problems are worse for Stafford's claim that "(our) Savior Jesus
Christ" is a compound proper name in both Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1. He offers
no actual evidence for this claim, although he compares the expression "(our)
Savior Jesus Christ" to "the compound name, 'Lord Jesus Christ.'"
Stafford-Response
And here Bowman fails to note significant parallel between "Lord Jesus Christ"
and Savior Jesus Christ." In my book I quote Ezra Abbot:
In the case before us, the omission of the article before swter ["Savior"] seems
to me to present no difficulty; not because ["Savior"] is made sufficiently
definite by the addition of hemwn ["of us"] (Winer), for since God as well as
Christ is often called "our Saviour," ["the glory of the great God and our
Savior"], standing alone, would most naturally be understood of one subject,
namely, God, the Father; but the addition of ["Jesus Christ"] to ["our Savior"]
changes the case entirely, restricting the s["our Savior"] to a person or being
who, according to Paul's habitual use of language, is distinguished from the
person or being whom he designates as ho theos, so that there was no need of the
repetition of the article to prevent ambiguity.
The fact is, the expression "Lord Jesus Christ" and "Savior Jesus Christ," even
if they were only used once in NT, are either used as compound proper names, or
the proper name "Jesus Christ" is used in apposition to the nouns "Lord" and
"Savior," and sufficiently restricts their application, even more than an
article would, for the referent is identified by name! But this leads to another
huge misunderstanding on Bowman's part:
Bowman-Sharp, page 18, note 46
But in support he quotes Murray Harris's assertion that Iêsous Christos "is
simply added in epexegesis."
Stafford-Response
In a footnote, Bowman remarks: "Of course, in context Harris is saying that the
expression `our great God and Savior' semantically and grammatically can stand
alone, with the proper name `Jesus Christ' added to explain who is meant by that
expression (this is what `epexegesis' means). Thus, Harris is directly
disagreeing with Stafford's point." I am quite aware of Harris' position, which
is precisely why I stated that "Jesus Christ," if used epexegetically, is only
defining who our Savior is. Bowman then quotes me:
GO TO CONCLUSION
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