Still More on Sharp's Rule, Rob Bowman and Trinitarianism
Part Three: Understanding the Restrictive Force and Semantic Significance of a
Proper Name in GS Constructions
By Greg Stafford
Rob Bowman's comments on the matter of semantic versus referential significance
not only fail to support his arguments for Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1, but they
actually add support to the position I have advocated all along, which is that
the context and the author's habitual use of language is essential for a proper
understanding of these issues. Also, the restrictive force of certain nouns and
noun phrases must be carefully evaluated.
Bowman fails to properly weigh and consider all of these factors, and,
apparently (see below), does not even attempt to use his own arguments about
semantic and referential significance to strengthen his position. Of course,
even if he did, they would not, as I have demonstrated in previous posts. It is
possible that he now understands this, and this is one reason why he claims that
some of his arguments were not intended to be used to support his view of Titus
2:13 or 2 Peter 1:1. In this light, I have to ask, as I do below, Rob, what are
you doing? Why are you telling us things we already know, which, when applied to
this discussion, do not support your view?
To appreciate why I ask these questions, consider the following discussion:
Posted by Rob Bowman on August 14, 1998 at 04:43:13:
BOWMAN:
In Part Two of my previous series of posts replying to Greg Stafford on Sharp's
rule, I argued that Stafford had failed to take into account a distinction
between two concepts relating to Sharp's rule. The first of these concepts is
that of the referential significance of a noun or noun phrase. Specifically, one
question that may be asked about an expression is whether it could have several
referents or is restricted to a single referent.
STAFFORD:
Of course, as I pointed out in previous reply, I did not fail to take this into
account. In fact, it is a key aspect of my argument! But, Bowman has a few
exercises he would like to walk us through. Please join me:
BOWMAN:
Let me illustrate this concept with some simple examples. On the left are
expressions that may have multiple referents. On the right are expressions that
can have only a single referent.
STAFFORD:
I will add one observation to Bowman's characterizations of the expressions on
the left, and that is this: In certain contexts the expressions on the left can
be used in such a way that they are just as restrictive as the expressions on
the right.
BOWMAN:
PLURAL REFERENTS SINGULAR REFERENT
President Sixteenth President of the United States of America
Academy Award winner The 1997 Best Actor Academy Award winner
Queen Queen Elizabeth II of England
Jesus Lord Jesus Christ
In these easiest to understand examples, the expressions on the right are such
that each can have one and only one referent. The designations are not and could
never be transferable to another referent. Furthermore, speaker (or writer),
context, subject matter, grammar, and the theological beliefs of the speaker are
irrelevant as to the referent of the expressions on the right.
STAFFORD:
On this point, I agree, and it is PRECISELY this point that I made in reference
to the expression "the great God" and "Savior Jesus Christ." See below and Parts
Four and Five for additional details on each of these expressions, and how
Bowman is selectively deciding what is restrictive and what is not.
BOWMAN:
Now, then there are expressions that may have different referents depending on
who the speaker or writer happens to be, but for a certain individual or group
may have only one referent. For example, "my daughter" potentially has a
multitude of referents but only one (we think!) if the speaker is President Bill
Clinton. "Our school" could refer to any of a large number of institutions, but
if these words are used in a speech at Fuller Theological Seminary, the number
of possible referents is one.
Furthermore, an expression may have many potential referents but may be limited
by the subject matter in the immediate context to a single referent. For
example, "the author" could refer to any of a large number of individuals but
must refer to John Steinbeck if in the immediate context the book that is being
discussed is The Grapes of Wrath.
An expression may also be limited or restricted to a single referent by the
grammar of the sentence in which it appears. For example, in the sentence, "John
Steinbeck's book The Grapes of Wrath was made into a movie starring Henry
Fonda," the word "book" could refer to several different writings (since
Steinbeck wrote more than one book) but grammatically is specified to have the
single referent The Grapes of Wrath.
Now, all I have been trying to explain here is what is meant when we speak of an
expression being referentially restricted. We mean that the expression is in
some way limited to or restricted to a specific referent.
STAFFORD:
Yes, I understand that, Rob. But you are missing my point, I believe (see
below). I am only going to quote Bowman's examples and conclusions on a few
points below, since I believe his point has been made, and I don't think he is
focused on my particular argument. Also, I can do without the disrespectful
references to political figures.
BOWMAN:
The second concept, which must be distinguished from the first even though it is
related to it, is that of semantic significance. Here the question of concern in
the Sharp's rule debate is not over the referent of a particular noun or noun
phrase, but the semantic place of that expression in the sentence of which it is
a part. Specifically, we may ask whether a particular expression is semantically
distinguished from or equated with the referent of another expression. This may
help us identify the referent of a particular expression, but it's a different
question.
Let's start with some easy examples. The examples on the left have distinct
referents because they are semantically distinguished from one another. The
examples on the right present two expressions that are semantically identified
as having the same referent.
PLURAL REFERENTS SINGULAR REFERENT
The President and First Lady The President and Commander-in-Chief
The President and Vice-President Her best friend and confidante
The winner and runner-up The winner and world champion
. . .
I am simply trying to illustrate the concept here of semantic relationships
between terms.
. . .
Now, the main point I was attempting to make in Part 2 of my previous response
to Stafford on Sharp's rule is that we need to distinguish referential
significance from semantic significance. Specifically, in a pair of expressions
linked together in some way, to whom they refer is a different question, though
it may be a related one, than the question of how the two expressions are
related semantically.
STAFFORD:
And I addressed both issues. You have not shown such semantic "pairing" for the
nouns in any of the texts under discussion (See below and Part Four and Five).
BOWMAN:
For example, in a sentence using the expression "the winner and champion,"
semantically the two nouns must refer to a single referent, but of course which
referent will depend on the context.
STAFFORD:
Did anybody have a problem understanding this? I doubt it. Why, then, are you
going on and on about this matter? In view of the nouns and the context of the
verses under discussion the above example has almost nothing to offer in terms
of contributing to this discussion. It LOOKS like a smoke screen, to me.
BOWMAN:
To apply this distinction to Titus 2:13 again, the question of the referent of
"the great God" is a different question than the question of whether "the great
God" has the same referent as "our Savior."
STAFFORD:
No it is not. Here is where the close relationship between semantic and
referential significance comes into play. For if the referent of "the great God"
is the Father, the one in whose glory Jesus is said to appear, then there is a
semantic distinction between "the great God" and "Savior Jesus Christ."
BOWMAN:
This is because the second question is a semantic question concerning the
relationship between the two noun expressions, whereas the first is not. If we
have good grounds for answering the semantic question in the affirmative (they
do have the same referent), this will have to be taken into account in answering
the first question.
STAFFORD:
Again, you are not properly handling the relationship between the two. To you,
the way you present it, the point in your first sentence is true. But that is
only because you will take "the great God" as a reference to Jehovah, Whom YOU
see as a tri-personal being that is capable of being applied to the Father and
the Son. BUT the Bible identifies Jehovah as the Father, the God of the Son, so
we have a semantic distinction between "the great God" (if taken as an OT
reference-see below) from "Jesus Christ." But you will not understand this until
you refrain from reading post-biblical distinctions into the text.
BOWMAN:
I doubt a point-by-point response to Stafford's comments on my previous
discussion will add much to what I have just said here. But let's see what can
be done to further clarify matters.
STAFFORD:
I will simply add that you have neglected a LARGE portion of my reply, and I
think that is part of the problem.
BOWMAN:
>>>Stafford---Now notice, Bowman agrees that I am correct in saying that a
descriptive phrase ("the first woman prime Minister of Great Britain") is more
restrictive than a proper name ("Margaret Thatcher") in this instance. But he
then says that this has "NOTHING to do with the issue at hand"! This is his way
of trying to minimize the impact of his concession. Of course, the restrictive
force or a particular noun of noun phrase has EVERYTHING to do with the present
issue, and Bowman goes to great lengths to confuse everybody about the real
issue, in my opinion.>>>
BOWMAN:
This comment really mystifies me. I have made no concession to any point at odds
with or in tension with my own position.
STAFFORD:
Yes, you have. Let me help you out here:
BOWMAN:
As I have stated all along, I absolutely insist, more consistently even than
Greg Stafford does, that "the great God" must refer to Jehovah, the only true
God. It helps, not hurts, my position to hold that "the great God" is so
restrictive in force that it cannot be fairly applied to a deity inferior to the
Almighty Creator. Stafford never explains how my so-called "concession" works to
my disadvantage.
STAFFORD:
Ah, here is the problem. You seem to think that every "point" I make has to
somehow work to your disadvantage or to my advantage. I can see how a person who
is selective in what he reveals might view things that way, but it is NOT always
my intention to make arguments that support my views. I make investigative
inquiries that are simply designed to present the facts. But, on this particular
point, let me remind you of the context of my reply:
<<FROM More on Sharp's Rule, Trinitarianism and Rob Bowman
Part Three: Descriptive Phrases and Their Restrictive Force
By Greg Stafford>>
BOWMAN:
The issue with regard to the applicability of Sharp's rule to Titus 2:13 and 2
Peter 1:1 is this: Do either or both of the nouns or noun phrases connected by
KAI have the character of a separate semantic unit which by its semantic nature
must refer to a separate referent? I imagine this question may be unclear to
some, so I will explain it.
Let's start with Greg's first example, taken from John Lyons. The noun phrase
"Margaret Thatcher" is indisputably a proper name. The noun phrase "the first
woman Prime Minister of Great Britain" is indisputably NOT a proper name. Still,
the second noun phrase has the same REFERENT as the first. Indeed, one may well
suppose that there are likely other women in history who have had the name
"Margaret Thatcher," but only one woman in history ever has and ever could be
designated using the noun phrase "the first woman Prime Minister of Great
Britain." As Greg says, this second expression is possibly even more
"restrictive" than the proper name. But this has NOTHING to do with the issue at
hand. Remember, the question is whether the two nouns or noun phrases joined by
KAI and governed by only one definite article refer to two objects or one. (In
discussing examples in the English language such as this one, we are of course
for the time being ignoring the differences between Greek and English.
Fortunately, those differences do not significantly affect the point at hand.)
STAFFORD:
Now notice, Bowman agrees that I am correct in saying that a descriptive phrase
("the first woman prime Minister of Great Britain") is more restrictive than a
proper name ("Margaret Thatcher") in this instance. But he then says that this
has "NOTHING to do with the issue at hand"! This is his way of trying to
minimize the impact of his concession. Of course, the restrictive force or a
particular noun of noun phrase has EVERYTHING to do with the present issue, and
Bowman goes to great lengths to confuse everybody about the real issue, in my
opinion. You'll see what I mean as we consider his examples:
<<END OF QUOTE-RETURN TO PRESENT DISCUSSION>>
STAFFORD:
Bowman has taken the position that "God," when used alone, in some/most (?), is
the equivalent to a proper name, but that when used with accompanying modifiers
it is not to be taken as such. He apparently fails to realize that the
restrictive force of a proper name is precisely why it does not conform to
Sharp's rule. Well, then, when we have an expression that is even MORE
restrictive than a proper name, how is it that he can he say "this has NOTHING
to do with the issue at hand"? Understanding the restrictive force and limited
application of certain nouns and noun phrases is a KEY point in the Sharp's rule
discussion. This is directly related to the issue of semantic significance.
In the end, Bowman concedes that "the great God" "must refer to Jehovah." This
would seem to mean, according to Bowman, that Sharp's rule is no longer
applicable to this verse. Remember, he claimed:
<<FROM BOWMAN'S ARTICLE ON SHARP'S RULE, PAGE 8>>
Martyrdom of Polycarp 22:1. . . . For Sharp's rule to be inapplicable it is
necessary only that one of the two nouns joined by kai be a proper name. Thus,
even if "God the Father" was not being used in Polycarp as a proper name,
Sharp's rule would not apply because of the use of "Holy Spirit" as such.
<<END OF QUOTE-RETURN TO PREVIOUS DISCUSSION>>
STAFFORD:
Well now, does everyone understand why I made my point, and why it creates
problems for Bowman's position?
First he states that "the great God" is not the equivalent to a proper name, and
then he agrees that it is, but refers exclusively to Jehovah, Whom Bowman
defines as a tri-personal being. But by admitting that "the great God" is as
restrictive as a proper name (indeed, even more so) he collides with his own
position on proper names and Sharp's rule.
Bowman believes "for Sharp's rule to be inapplicable it is necessary only that
one of the two nouns joined by kai be a proper name." So, then, since he now
takes "the great God" as the equivalent to a proper name, he is implying that
Sharp's rule is not applicable to Titus 2:13. Of course, he also fails to
realize that "the great God" is restricted to Jehovah, not a tri-personal being,
but a single person, the Father, the God of Jesus. (Micah 5:4; Rev. 3:12) This
creates a semantic distinction between the two, which, if correct (that is, if
the OT is in fact the source of the expression "the great God") is enough to
show that Sharp's rule does not apply in this verse. This view is reinforced
when you consider other aspects of the context, particularly the Synoptic
background to the teaching concerning Christ's appearing in his FATHER'S glory.
Again, this is the FATHER'S glory, not that of a tri-personal being.
BOWMAN:
I had written:
>>>Suppose we read the following sentence:
S1. I'm waiting for my wife and Margaret Thatcher.
In (S1) there is very little reason to doubt that the speaker's wife is someone
other than Margaret Thatcher. This is a good example of a proper name being
linked with another noun phrase by "and" where it is clear that two persons are
meant.>>>
Stafford replied:
>>>In English this is true, and it is also true, to some degree, in Greek. But
the English word for "and" has a much stronger tendency to separate two (or
more) nouns than does the Greek word KAI. For example, if we were to put
Bowman's example in Greek, it would be hE GUNE MOU KAI [proper name]. In Greek
this example does not distinguish between "my wife" and the person denoted by
the proper name as much as the English example does. KAI can imply apposition,
and if in our Greek example it could be established that the person's "wife" is
also known by the name that follows KAI, then there is nothing to keep us from
taking the proper name in apposition to hE GUNE MOU ("my wife"). In English,
however, the use of "and" in Bowman's example would almost always (probably
always!) be understood as a reference to two persons, unless it could be shown
that the speaker did in fact have the same person in mind, but simply chose a
poorly worded sentence. So Bowman has not properly explained the differences
between the English "and" and the Greek KAI, which gives the false impression
that his example is somehow relevant to our discussion. Please keep in mind that
proper names and proper name equivalents all have a certain degree of
restrictive force. But the English "and" and the Greek KAI are not always used
in the same way.
We recall, of course, that Bowman prefaced his examples by saying that he would
`for the time being ignore the differences between Greek and English.
Fortunately, those differences do not significantly affect the point at hand.'
But they do "significantly affect the point at hand," at least with regard to
S1.>>>
BOWMAN:
This is all very interesting, but completely irrelevant, since all I was trying
to do was to illustrate the difference between referential and semantic
significance.
STAFFORD:
That is all very interesting, but you completely miss my point, which is in
direct response to your illustration, and your claim that "there is very little
reason to doubt that the speaker's wife is someone other than Margaret Thatcher.
This is a good example of a proper name being linked with another noun phrase by
`and' where it is clear that two persons are meant." Please try to stay focused
on what I am saying, not what you THINK I'm saying.
BOWMAN:
The purpose of giving (S1) was to compare it to (S2) in order to illustrate that
distinction. I did not claim that (S1) was grammatically equivalent to Titus
2:13. This is a fundamental misreading of the way I was developing my argument,
and it vitiates Stafford's entire response. For example, regarding (S2),
Stafford asserted:
>>>Of course, in the long run Bowman wants us to see this sentence (S2) as a
grammatical parallel to Titus 2:13.>>>
No, although it is partially parallel, it is not intended to function as a
grammatically precise parallel to Titus 2:13 in order to warrant my
interpretation of Titus 2:13 by such a parallel. This was not my intent, nor my
claim. Stafford is reading that intent into my paper - which is why he had to
qualify his assertion with the expression "in the long run." But I don't make
this claim in the short or long run.
STAFFORD:
Then what is your point in making these comparisons? Where did I say that you
intended it as a "grammatically precise parallel"? Stop reading things into my
replies, please. Tell us, Rob, what is your point of making these comparisons if
not to eventually make a point concerning our subject texts? In fact, consider
the paragraph that my above paragraph, the one where I discuss the disjunctive
and connective force of KAI, is in response to:
<<FROM More on Sharp's Rule, Trinitarianism and Rob Bowman
Part Three: Descriptive Phrases and Their Restrictive Force
By Greg Stafford>>
BOWMAN:
Let me show why I say the "restrictive force" of a noun phrase has nothing to do
with the applicability of Sharp's rule with a series of examples.
Suppose we read the following sentence:
S1. I'm waiting for my wife and Margaret Thatcher.
In (S1) there is very little reason to doubt that the speaker's wife is someone
other than Margaret Thatcher. This is a good example of a proper name being
linked with another noun phrase by "and" where it is clear that two persons are
meant. Now consider this sentence:
<<END OF QUOTE-RETURN TO PRESENT DISCUSSION>>
STAFFORD:
As you can see, Bowman makes an unfounded claim regarding the restrictive force
of a noun and Sharp's rule, and my reply shows why his examples do not support
his position. Instead of dealing with my point, he simply brushes it aside as
"interesting" and claims that I misunderstood him. Another smoke screen. Again,
a noun's restrictive force has a direct relationship with the issue of semantic
distinction.
BOWMAN:
Stafford makes the same mistake with regard to (S3), about which he wrote:
>>>Of course, the above example is not at all parallel to Titus 2:13, which has
a descriptive phrase followed by KAI, followed by a noun, followed by a proper
name.>>>
Regarding (S4):
>>>Now, to more closely parallel Titus 2:13 Bowman should have said, "the
Commander-in-chief and President Bill Clinton.">>>
This misunderstanding is implicit throughout his response, but is made explicit
again on (S11):
STAFFORD:
Again, there is no misunderstanding. I am simply making a point, which I feel is
warranted, so that people reading our discussion don't get the impression that
you are making a credible point about our subject texts.
Bowman failed to give my complete reply, so I will give it plus another section
he ignored:
<<FROM More on Sharp's Rule, Trinitarianism and Rob Bowman
Part Three: Descriptive Phrases and Their Restrictive Force
By Greg Stafford >>
BOWMAN:
S4. We're waiting for the President and Commander-in-Chief, Bill Clinton.
I suppose we might imagine a situation in which the speaker of (S4) is a company
executive and he is referring to the immanent arrival of the company CEO along
with Bill Clinton. However, anyone who tried to communicate this idea using (S4)
would have expressed himself very poorly. That the two nouns both refer to Bill
Clinton is confirmed not only by the fact that both titles commonly refer to him
(or to anyone holding the office) but that they are governed by the single
definite article "the." Indeed, I have trouble conceiving of a context in which
someone might say (S4) and be reasonably construed as referring to two persons.
Again, that one person is meant would be clear with or without the addition of
the proper name "Bill Clinton."
STAFFORD:
I don't think such a sentence is as awkward as S1 or S2 above, and it is
certainly more grammatically acceptable than either of Bowman's first two
examples. Bowman's statement "That the two nouns both refer to Bill Clinton is
confirmed not only by the fact that both titles commonly refer to him (or to
anyone holding the office) but that they are governed by the single definite
article `the,'" is begging the question. The context would have to reveal just
whom the speaker/writer is talking about. Grammatically, the English "and" is
quite capable of distinguishing the two nouns.
Now, to more closely parallel Titus 2:13 Bowman should have said, "the
Commander-in-chief and President Bill Clinton." But we would, of course,
understand this as a reference to Bill Clinton, because the nouns used, at this
time, are restricted to Mr. Clinton. But if we were to say, "the California
Governor and President Bill Clinton" we would rightly recognize a reference to
Pete Wilson and Bill Clinton, because the concepts associated with these two
descriptions are, at this time, only properly to be understood of these two
persons. Or if, in response to a person's inquiry about the speakers at today's
corporate meeting, I said the speakers would include "the President of the
United States and coach Pat Riley," who would doubt that two persons are in
view, and that the proper name "Pat Riley" was in apposition only to "coach"?
Consider Bowman's next example:
BOWMAN"
Here's another example:
S5. We're waiting for the sixteenth President of the United States and author of
the Emancipation Proclamation, Abraham Lincoln.
Here the two designations "sixteenth President of the United States" and "author
of the Emancipation Proclamation" are equally "restrictive," that is, each
designation can refer to one and only one referent, Abraham Lincoln. Yet,
obviously, both designations refer to the same referent. Thus, the fact that
"sixteenth President of the United States" is rigidly descriptive of one person
does not have anything to do with whether the subsequent designation "author of
the Emancipation Proclamation" refers to the same individual.
STAFFORD:
I almost cannot believe that Bowman is employing this kind of reasoning to try
and refute my arguments. In the above example the first descriptive phrase is
limited in reference to the same individual referred to in the second part of
the sentence, who is also identified by the proper name "Abraham Lincoln." As I
stated earlier, I don't think Bowman understands my objection, or he is simply
unable to produce any semblance of a worthy rejoinder. If the first descriptive
phrase were "the Supreme Court chief justice" then we would naturally understand
two persons to be in view because Abraham Lincoln was not a Supreme Court chief
justice. The descriptive phrase would apply to the person who occupied that
position at the time indicated by the statement. Again, context and habitual use
of language are more important in terms of identifying the referent in these
examples.
<<END OF QUOTE-RETURN TO PRESENT DISCUSSION>>
BOWMAN:
>>>Stafford--Bowman is using terms that are much more distinct, as if this
somehow parallels Titus 2:13 or 2 Peter 1:1.>>>
BOWMAN:
This misunderstanding is so fatal to a proper assessment of my argument that
further critique of Stafford's reply to this part would be pointless. All I will
take the time to do here is to reply to a couple more assertions by Stafford
that, while not germane to my argument, should be answered somewhere.
STAFFORD:
How convenient. We all understand your point about semantic and referential
significance. But I am pointing out that nothing you have said thus far in any
way supports your argument about the texts we are SUPPOSED to be discussing.
Obviously you agree with me, since you make no attempt at all to discredit my
arguments.
Bowman completely ignored this and other portions of my reply:
<<FROM More on Sharp's Rule, Trinitarianism and Rob Bowman
Part Three: Descriptive Phrases and Their Restrictive Force
By Greg Stafford >>
BOWMAN:
S2. I'm waiting for the first woman prime minister of England and my wife,
Margaret Thatcher.
Given that the speaker is Denis Thatcher, both noun phrases "the first woman
prime minister" and "my wife" are equally "restrictive." However, without
question both refer to one person. This would be true, in fact, even if the
proper name "Margaret Thatcher" were not added. The fact that the expression
"the first woman prime minister of England" is just as restrictive, if not more
so, than "Margaret Thatcher" DOES NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH WHETHER THE
SECOND NOUN PHRASE REFERS TO THE SAME PERSON.
STAFFORD:
Notice that Bowman has to appeal to elements OUTSIDE the grammar of the
sentence, namely, the presupposition pool of Denis Thatcher and those familiar
with him and family. Bowman also uses an example that one would most likely
NEVER hear from the mouth of Denis Thatcher! Again, I cannot think of anyone, in
any context, that would use the English "and" in the way Bowman has given in his
example. Well, actually I can think of one: If Denis Thatcher were introducing
his wife before a live audience he might say, "I present to you, the first woman
prime minister of England and my wife, Margaret Thatchter." But I think that in
most other contexts the more likely expression would be, "I am waiting for my
wife, Margaret Thatcher, the first woman prime minister of England"; or, " I am
waiting for the first woman prime minister of England, my wife, Margaret
Thatcher"; or, "I am waiting for the first woman prime minister of England,
Margaret Thatcher, my wife."
In any event, Bowman has simply created an English sentence using terms that
could only be understood of one person, not because of the grammar, but because
they are restricted to but one individual in the context of this statement, in
view of Denis Thatcher's habitual use of language. Of course, in the long run
Bowman wants us to see this sentence (S2) as a grammatical parallel to Titus
2:13. Remarkably, Bowman claims, "The fact that the expression `the first woman
prime minister of England is just as restrictive, if not more so, than `Margaret
Thatcher' DOES NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH WHETHER THE SECOND NOUN PHRASE
REFERS TO THE SAME PERSON." It is hard to take Rob seriously when he uses
reasoning like this, but I'll try! Of course, the fact that the first
descriptive phrase "the first woman prime minister of England" could ONLY apply
to the same person denoted in the second part of the sentence is the key.
Bowman's statement is completely unfounded, however. Suppose Denis Thatcher had
said: "I am waiting for the first woman President of the United States and my
wife, Margaret Thatcher." The woman so described in the first part of the
sentence would never be considered the same woman in the second part of the
sentence, because the concepts created by the descriptive phrase in the first
instance are not the same as those created by the proper name "Margaret
Thatcher," in reference to the Denis Thatcher's wife.
BOWMAN:
Now, let's consider Greg's second example, the use of the title "President" to
refer to a specific individual (currently Bill Clinton). What Greg says about
this title is quite correct, but not to the point. For example, he is quite
right in saying that the title "President" in certain contexts would refer
unambiguously to Bill Clinton even though the word may be used in other contexts
with other referents (e.g., Boris Yeltsin is the President of Russia). He is
also correct in saying that the title may be made more "restrictive" with
further modifiers. For example, we could speak of "the President of the United
States" (which must refer to one of the U.S. presidents, though context must
still tell us which one) or even "the sixteenth President of the United States"
(which must refer to Abraham Lincoln). But any of these descriptive noun phrases
might be used in a construction in which it is joined with the word "and" to
another noun or noun phrase, with the whole expression referring to one person.
For example:
S3. Bill Clinton is the President and Commander-in-Chief.
STAFFORD:
What Bowman says is true, "but not to the point." The construction of the above
sentence is such that anyone would understand it to be an assertion about one
person. In other words, the nouns used would in NO WAY change the fact that they
are both restricted to Bill Clinton. So, if I said, "Bill Clinton is the
President and the prime minister of England," anyone remotely familiar with
English would realize that what I said is not true. Of course, the above example
is not at all parallel to Titus 2:13, which has a descriptive phrase followed by
KAI, followed by a noun, followed by a proper name.
BOWMAN:
Now, let's mix things up a bit. Suppose we read the following sentence:
S6. We're waiting for the President and First Lady to arrive.
Here, even though the noun "President" and noun phrase "First Lady" are governed
by one definite article and are joined with "and," the two nouns refer
unambiguously to two persons. Why? NOT because one or the other expression has a
"restrictive force" equivalent to that of a proper name, as the preceding
examples prove.
STAFFORD:
Whoops…Let's stop here for a moment. Bowman's examples did not prove anything in
support of his point, so let's not proceed with the false impression that they
did. Actually, his examples only served to further strengthen what I have been
saying all along.
BOWMAN:
Rather, the two expressions unambiguously refer to two distinct referents
because the two expressions are "paired" terms, i.e., two expressions that are
commonly used to refer to a pair that belong together but are two distinct
objects. We have lots of such expressions in English: salt and pepper, sun and
moon, father and son, husband and wife, mother and daughter, President and
Vice-President, king and queen, and many more. In Greek, as in English, the use
of such paired expressions would indicate unambiguously that two terms are meant
even in a Sharp's rule type of construction. Such paired terms should always be
taken as denoting two referents unless explicitly stated otherwise.
STAFFORD:
There are examples where certain nouns or noun phrases are understood as
distinct from one another because they are usually seen as pairs. But, again,
the restrictive force of each noun is still very much a part of our shared
presuppositions about such expressions, which we naturally associate with the
semantic signs (words) that we hear or read.
<<END OF QUOTE-RETURN TO PRESENT DISCUSSION>>
STAFFORD:
I assume everyone understands why talking to Bowman is really a fruitless
endeavor, for he consistently ignores HUGE sections of my reply, which results
in an inaccurate transmission of my point.
BOWMAN:
I had written:
>>>Greg objected to this exception [paired nouns as having two referents even in
article-noun-KAI-noun expressions] as question-begging since it would supposedly
preclude an author applying both terms in such a noun pair to a single referent
(for example, if someone held to the monarchian doctrine that Jesus was both the
Father and the Son). But this is no problem at all. Any author who wants to make
this idea clear can do so in a number of ways. For example:
S7. Jesus is the Father and Son.
S8. Jesus is the Father and the Son.
S9. The Father is the Son.
Any of these sentences unambiguously communicates the idea that the Father and
the Son are two different designations for the same referent.>>>
Stafford replied:
<<And if Clement held to such a view then what he said would also unambiguously
communicate his ideas concerning the Father and Son! Because we know that such
views DID exist it is begging the question to appeal to what we SHOULD recognize
as true, namely, that the terms are ALWAYS "paired" terms! Does everybody see
the circle? It goes like this:
Clement uses the two terms in a construction that often refers to one person.
But the words "Father" and "Son" are always used as "paired" terms for two
different persons.
Therefore, Clement's use of the words "Father" and "Son" are in reference to two
different persons.
Bowman uses reasoning like this all the time, and I usually assume that most of
you who are reading our discussion can detect it, but I had to make sure you
understood the problem with this one.>>>
BOWMAN:
No, even if Clement held to monarchianism, his referring to "the Father and Son"
would not "unambiguously communicate" a monarchian belief. For it to be
unambiguous, there would have to be something explicit in the context to show
that he was using the two titles of one person.
STAFFORD:
(!) First of all I am referring specifically to what Clement said, and then I
make an assumption that if he held to the view that the Father and Son were the
same person, then "what he said would also unambiguously communicate his ideas
concerning the Father and Son." Since the grammar allows for such an
understanding, IF that is his clearly stated position elsewhere in his writings,
then your point about paired terms is begging the question in this instance. How
you consistently fail to properly understand or address my point remains a
mystery.
BOWMAN:
There's nothing wrong with my reasoning, which Stafford has misrepresented. It
goes like this:
a. Paired nouns that normally refer to two referents, do so unless a single
referent is made explicit.
b. Clement uses paired nouns without making a single referent explicit.
c. Therefore, Clement is using the paired nouns to refer to two referents.
STAFFORD:
Good, so now you recognize that explicit articulation of the relationship is
necessary, and that what YOU might construe as paired nouns that are
semantically distinct from each other, are not distinct unless the context and
theology of the author say so. I am glad you are starting to accept this point,
which I have maintained from the beginning.
BOWMAN:
Stafford wrote:
>>>Regarding the passages from NT that our the focus of our discussion, both the
context and the author's habitual use of language restrict the phrase "the great
God" and even "God" to the Father. I agree that the case is not certain either
way, but the evidence points heavily in favor of a two-person translation.>>>
BOWMAN:
The author of Titus 2:13 is Paul, and he uses the expression "the great God"
precisely one time: Titus 2:13. Thus, the author's habitual use of language
tells us nothing about this expression.
STAFFORD:
If he nowhere else predicate "God" of Jesus, but reserves it for the Father
(never for the triune God, though) then THAT habitual use of language is quite
useable when it comes to establishing a likelihood that he would use the
expression "the great God" for the One to whom he elsewhere restricts the term
"God." Since the author's use of language does not offer any support for your
view, I can understand your refusing to accept it.
BOWMAN:
I agree that Paul rarely uses the title "God" specifically with reference to the
Son.
STAFFORD:
Let's rephrase that a bit: Paul NEVER unambiguously uses the term "God" for the
Son.
BOWMAN:
However, since you acknowledge that Paul might use the title for the Son, you
cannot then argue that the title is "restricted" to the Father. This is
double-talk. If the title may be used of the Son, it is not restricted to the
Father.
STAFFORD:
Obviously you have a problem understanding what a person MIGHT say and what they
DO say. If we go by the author's use of language, that language restricts the
term to the Father. But that does not mean the author could not break from his
normal use of language, particularly if that use of language is taken from a
different cultural and literary context, and make a true statement concerning
Jesus' godhood, that is in harmony with biblical theology. This is not
double-talk at all, but an observation based on the facts as given in the
writings of Paul, and the theology which he shared with the other Bible writers,
none of whom articulated anything commensurate with trinitarianism.
END OF PART THREE
GO TO PART FOUR
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