Rejoinder to Stafford's Response to Hartley
By Don Hartley, Th. M. (Ph.D student Dallas Theological
Seminary)
This is a belated (approximately 6 months) reply to Stafford. It is a follow up
to his response to my comments made over his remarks on the WEB about my article
published at the Biblical Studies Foundation web cite. For the reader's benefit
he might first consult my article, "Revisiting the Colwell Construction in Light
of Mass/Count Nouns" then the initial comments Stafford makes about the article
(originally publicly posted at the Trinity Discussion Board but subsequently
archived and deleted), followed by my response to these initial comments , then
Stafford's rebuttal of these comments and finally this rejoinder to his response
.
Below several issues are repeatedly revisited: (1) My methodology of
categorizing mass/count nouns, (2) The issue of lexical tagging and semantic
signaling supposedly circumventing the semantic category of Q-d, (3) The
treatment of Harner and his abuse suffered at the hands of Stafford, (4) The
accusation of reading of later theology into the text, (4) Language and reality,
and (5) Other incidentals related to Stafford's mishandling of John 1:1.
This response is long in coming. Most of the comments below are simply an
attempt to untangle some misunderstandings that continue to surface as I read
Stafford's reply to what I have written. I did not deem his rebuttal as
particularly striking or detrimental in any way to my article on Colwell's
construction. Although I do believe that Stafford has put forth his best attempt
in arguing an Arian view of John 1:1 it nevertheless fails miserably to
convince. Beyond this I am continually baffled at his evasive attempts to get
around the semantic understanding of the mass noun. I guess I can understand his
fear in conceding to this in the light of putting to rest his particular view of
John 1:1. I am also mystified at how my study is perceived or rather framed by
him as dependent on "later theology" for its strength. Stafford needs to be
reminded that it is Arianism which began subsequent the first century and which
the church rightly rejected as heresy. It is quite an anachronistic undertaking
to suppose one can read out of the NT documents rather than into the text these
Arian ideas.
STAFFORD
Hartley apparently did not gather from my brief remarks that I am writing a
response to his article, which, to be honest, contains a number of
misunderstandings, particularly as they relate to the classification of count
nouns, as well as his treatment of John 1:1.
RESPONSE
I eagerly await a response without ad hominem. But let me assert something at
the outset of this rejoinder-and this is key. As I understand Stafford, he
essentially has two major problems with my article as it relates to John 1:1.
The first issue relates directly to the semantics of the mass noun-is it purely
or exclusively qualitative or does it always intrinsically entail indefiniteness
as well? The second relates to the application of this sense to the singular
count noun in John 1:1c. Two subsidiary but related problems concern semantic
categories Q without I, and to a lesser degree I without Q.
Now he mentions these issues below, and I will treat them accordingly. But the
reader should keep these two issues in mind as he (or she) proceeds through the
response.
Now Stafford indicates that my methodology of classifying mass/count nouns are
incorrect or inadequate. But my method is clearly spelled out in the article,
and is based on lexemic rather than contextual factors. The distinction Stafford
makes in "lexical tagging" and "semantic signaling" (to avoid the implications
of both the semantics of mass nouns and the transferal to singular count nouns
[John 1:1, 14]) is his way of denying the semantic category of Q-d (Q). In other
words that John 1:14 indubitably points to the idea that Jesus is a human being
is an inference based on the passage. But the passage does not state it in those
terms. It simply states Jesus became "flesh" or "human." The fact that the noun
is mass, the construction is Colwell's, and that it is discourse related
chiastically to John 1:1c, all converge to indicate a purely qualitative
semantic to both nouns ("God" and "flesh"). To state Jesus is "a man" because
"flesh" signals this direction is a fair deduction in the long run-but that is
an extralingual inference. The only reason we know Jesus was "a man" from
"flesh" is simply because we know of an existing group having that
characteristic. We know there are other men or humans. Thus if Jesus is human,
he must necessarily be a human. But Stafford goes further and insists that the
noun is to be regarded as I-Q (Q-I) because of this semantic signaling. This
kind of maneuver runs into problems and cannot be worked out practically with
all mass nouns. For example, "God is love" would signal "God is a love." This is
absurd. But it is not simply the fact that this procedure cannot be applied
universally to all mass nouns so much as it is a methodologically flawed
adventure.
Applying this procedure to other mass nouns illustrates its absurdity. "The
stone became bread" does not mean "The stone became a bread." Neither would it
be correct to infer that if several stones became bread that therefore one
cannot have bread but breads. "The man became silver" does not mean "The man
became a silver." Nor would it be correct to infer that if several men became
silver that therefore we are left with silvers. "The chair is furniture" does
not mean "The chair is a furniture." It would be a silly notion to infer from a
room full of chairs, tables and foot stools that we have a room full of
furnitures or that each one demands an indefinite article-a furniture." The
liquid is coffee" does not mean "The liquid is a coffee." Nor would it be sound
at a dinner party with a room full of different blends or brands of coffee for
the guests to refer to the room as "a room full of coffees" but simply as the
coffee room or the room with all sorts of coffee. The latter idea is an example
of limiting a mass noun by an ammassive. "The house is concrete" does not mean
"The house is a concrete." Nor would several homes made of concrete demand that
we understand the homes are concretes. By concrete we mean "made of concrete."
No amount of "semantic signaling" changes the fact of the semantic notion of
mass nouns.
Furthermore, referring to the category of Q as I-Q (Q-I) is to completely ignore
the differences between these two semantic ideas and thus to miss what the
author had in mind. Certainly there is a difference between saying "John is
human" (Q) and "John is a man" (I-Q or I). Qualities alone are emphasized (Q),
qualities as well as individual within the group (Q-I) or simply an individual
among a group with qualities in the background (I). It is an illegitimate
totality transfer of the oddest sort to jump to the first sense (Q-d) through
semantic signaling a Q-I (I-Q) category.
STAFFORD
Of course, if you ask Hartley he does not need to read my reply, for he has
already made up his mind and foretold the type of reply that I would give. He
wrote:
"I am aware that this subsequent critique will be met with the often yet
meaningless phrases, "He has completely misunderstood . . . ." or "He is totally
confused . . . ." et al. But the truth of the matter is quite to the contrary."
RESPONSE
Now, the facade Stafford wishes to advance is the notion that he remains open
minded and others who disagree with him, if they have reached conclusions
opposite from his own, are somehow recalcitrant or reading later theology into
the text. It is ironic how this later theology is always Trinitarian rather than
Arian. So much of Stafford's response is given to this type of argumentation,
albeit irrelevant to either my study or the issues at hand. My study, on the
contrary, was one of induction and probabilities. Disputed passages (like John
1:1) were excluded from the tabulations and were determined by them later. The
probabilities that the singular count noun theos in John 1:1c is Q or I-Q is
mentioned in the article. The semantic category Stafford wishes for is simply
statistically improbable for singular count nouns in John's Gospel (56%Q, 17% I,
17% I-Q, and 11% D). Now this study has been met by Stafford with the
predictable statements mentioned above. But how this is to be related to my
mental well-being or my willingness to read what Stafford says is beyond me. I
read what he says per chance there is something between these types of
statements worth considering.
STAFFORD
Obviously Hartley is not going to acknowledge his glaring shortcomings, but they
are quite obvious, and I can assure you that the remarks I made, in passing, are
far from meaningless" (see below); rather, they are entirely accurate in terms
of describing Hartley's treatment of the issues under consideration. But, again,
Hartley's immature disposition is one that cannot be taken seriously, especially
when he characterizes an eventual reply based on a few passing remarks, that
were not even spoken to him. But, as you will see, there is little else for him
to grasp onto in hopes of reading his view into the text, and when it comes to
explaining his misrepresentation of my material.
RESPONSE
There are no doubt shortcomings in my article that need working over. The
problem is that Stafford pretends to have identified the nature of these
shortcomings. But from what I have read of his comments, there seems to be a
tremendous ellipsis, on the one hand, between those "glaring shortcomings" that
are reportedly "quite obvious" and on the other hand his criticisms of the
article found in his response. The connection between the glaring shortcomings
and the actual data is conspicuously absent.
I was made aware of Stafford's comments on-line. I found them and responded. For
some reason he finds this strange since it was supposedly personal, being
addressed to an individual other than myself. All well and good if it is truly
personal (e-mail). But if it is addressed to an individual on the WEB it is in
the public domain. The fact that others made me aware of the posting and I was
able to subsequently access it is proof enough of its public character. It is
irrelevant, therefore, that it was "not even spoken" to me. In fact I find his
response here a bit immature.
Now I am accused of reading my "view" into the text-an oft repeated theme of
his. If anything should be clear from my article, it would be the opposite. No
one with my theological convictions would deliberately construct a study where
the generic whole of the NT regarding singular count nouns is I-Q-a fact still
misrepresented by Stafford. This fact alone indicates that the statistics were
compiled quite independent of theology. The paper sought to follow a linguistic
method of grammatical study, not judge whether it was legitimate only if it
conformed to a so-called later theology (Arian or otherwise). It will be left to
scholars to judge whether that has been faithfully and soundly executed. As for
me, all I can say is that I proceeded with objectivity to the best of my ability
quite apart from and at times nearly detrimental to the historic faith. My
results are the expression of grammar not theology. Since I used the former and
only appealed to the latter in assessing John 1:1 it can hardly be used as the
cause of my findings.
In regards to supposedly misrepresenting his material, what follows below will
demonstrably prove the fallaciousness of that charge. But isn't this always the
accusation Stafford labels on those who arrive at different conclusions than
himself? And further, isn't this what I predicted would happen? Yet my
prediction was ironically turned into a disposition on my part to be intractable
or unwilling to even read his response. Although this response is six months
behind, I read his rebuttal within days of its initial posting.
STAFFORD
This is truly amazing. Hartley actually considers my brief comments on his
article, which I gave after a casual reading of key sections since people were,
for some reason, excited to find such an article that they thought had cast some
doubt on something I said in my book, a "response." No wonder he calls it
"feeble"! Hartley can feel free to wait until I actually give a response before
he labels my response as "feeble." But, then again, since he has only succeeded
in demonstrating the very point I made in my "feeble response" it probably does
not matter that he jumped the gun here.
RESPONSE
Now in regards to the article about casting doubt on his book. Only two
footnotes mention Stafford. These notes were added to the article after it was
written. Further, this article is a condensed version of the Thesis in 1996, two
years before his book was published. The article (and Thesis) were written with
the intent of finding out, as scientifically as possible, what the semantics of
an anarthrous pre-copulative PN was. A key to the whole thesis is the
understanding of the semantics of mass nouns-and I hate to repeat myself but
here it is again-is that mass nouns cannot be indefinitized nor semantically
pluralized. Thus the noun is always qualitative (Q) without the possibility of
indefiniteness being included at all-thus labeled Q-d. And yes the result of
this does cast considerable doubt if not completely dismantles the argument put
forth in Stafford's book.
Now this alone indicates Stafford's real problem. He does not want to admit of
such a semantic category beyond stating that it is "possible." But we have
proved it is not just possible but actual. When confronted with this piece of
evidence, as stated above, he denies it and tries to wrench out of a mass noun
(John 1:14 SARX) an indefinite sense. Thus given the chance to acknowledge its
actuality, he denies it. Now that is quite convenient, when one wants to protect
a theology, but also quite misleading when evidence is produced giving actuality
to his possibility and he then denies both it and its implications.
Below is the issue of Harner, Stafford's use (abuse) of him, and his anemic
attempt to discredit the whole discussion.
STAFFORD
I honestly cannot figure out how some of you trinitarians fail to understand the
point so frequently and in so many respects. And then you marvel at and object
to my highlighting of your careless handling of the material. At least this has
proven true in the case of several others, and Hartley appears to be following
suit. Let me show you what I mean:
RESPONSE
Stafford claims to provide a refutation of my claim that Stafford gets Q = I-Q
from an abuse of Harner's work. It would not be an abuse if he simply recognized
the semantic category, but he goes much further than that. But the reader needs
to keep in mind Stafford's real fear-the semantic nuance of mass nouns applied
to count nouns. He invariably ties indefiniteness to qualitativeness in his
headlong desire to deny the category of qualitativeness alone as existing.
STAFFORD
Recall my objection to Hartley's comments: "The author [Hartley] is totally
confused about what I have said on this matter, which has nothing to do with
Harner's analysis." So, you would think that Hartley's response would contain a
section from my book that shows that I state or imply that Harner suggested or
implied that "qualitativeness [was] intrinsically or necessarily bound to this
semantic tag."
RESPONSE
I do have a section (which he cites later) on how Stafford uses Harner's study.
It is clearly laid out in the article and in my first response. Stafford goes on
to quote my response. Here is what I said:
The discussion surrounding Harner's study is the misuse Stafford makes of it as
it is discussed in his book (JWD, 179-85) and practically worked out in his
appendix by Al Kidd (341-43). I could have spent a lot of ink dealing with
Stafford's misunderstanding of Colwell, Dixon and Harner to mention only a few
but my purpose in discussing Harner was to appreciate the legitimate semantical
perimeters that Harner's article would justifiably lead a reader to infer. In
other words, Does Harner insist or suggest that Q = I-Q? The re-examination was
necessary because Jehovah's Witnesses consistently cite him as confirming their
understanding that qualitativeness (Q) = indefinite-qualitative(I-Q or Q-I).
Stafford comments on the above statement.
STAFFORD
1) Where in my book do I claim or imply that Harner suggested or implied that "qualitativeness
[was] intrinsically or necessarily bound to this semantic tag"? Note: I am, at
this point, merely concentrating on the specific charge that I used Harner in
this way. You may read the pages to which Hartley refers, but nowhere in my book
will you find such a use of Harner, neither by myself or by Al Kidd.
RESPONSE
I attempted to demonstrate in my first response that this is exactly what
Stafford does with Harner's article. Of course Harner didn't infer this
necessary connection between indefiniteness and qualitativeness, but Stafford
always assumes it. To repeat, Harner stated that Q and indefiniteness were not
inimical to each other which is a far cry from never being separate as Stafford
insists! (see below)-that is THE abuse of Harner. Now the question is, Did
Stafford use Harner in such a way as to legitimize his translation of "a god" in
John 1:1c? The answer is unequivocally YES.
For an understanding of this whole issue one only needs to consult my article.
The point of Harner and the point to which Stafford and JW's have historically
capitalized on is Harner's blending of these categories (Q and I), especially
Harner's phrase, "primarily qualitative" because this allows them to retain
indefiniteness universally. Stafford even cites the 1984 NWT to indicate this as
well as denying that it is "definite" -a point at which I agree. He then
chastens Robert Bowman for noting this abuse with characteristic double-talk.
And it is here that his purpose for using Harner is clear. Stafford states,
"True if citing Harner's article were for the purpose of using his conclusions
as evidence that Harner himself understood theos in John 1:1c as a reference to
a being, who though having the nature of God, was nonetheless some sort of
inferior divine being, this would then betray a misunderstanding of his article"
(JWD, 182 emphasis added).
Now we live in the Clinton era where statements need parsing. Perhaps the reader
has already caught the gaffe. But lets make plain what is said here. The key
idea in order to quality as abuse for Stafford is located in the phrase "that
Harner himself understood." His point is rather ludicrous. Namely, If we present
Harner's research as indicating that the phrase should be translated as "a god"
and if we concurrently indicate that this is what Harner himself believed, then
that enterprise would be illegitimate-for obviously Harner is a Trinitarian, and
Trinitarians don't concur with that idea. So if we (JWs) said he believed this,
of course that would be incorrect and "betray a misunderstanding of his
article." So Stafford conveniently sets himself free and clear to continue to
misrepresent the research of Harner all the while claiming he is not
misrepresenting Harner because he is not claiming that "Harner himself
understood theos in John 1:1c as a reference to a being, who though having the
nature of God, was nonetheless some sort of inferior divine being" (JWD, 182).
So Stafford first abuses Harner's study then denies it by redefining what
constitutes that abuse!
But this is not what Bowman meant by abuse in his comments at all-Stafford knows
this. What Stafford is in effect saying is Harner's personal belief in the
Trinity is contrary to his [Harner] own statistical results, and we [JWs] are
using his results which support an indefinite-qualitative sense to John 1:1c,
but we are not alleging this is the belief of Harner, for Harner clearly
believed and stated the opposite-apparently opposite of his own results.
In effect Stafford denies a charge never leveled against him, namely that JWs
use of Harner was a representation that Harner himself was an Arian! Since
Stafford never used Harner for such a venture, he denies the abuse. But this is
not the abuse, nor the charge. But it is here, and places mentioned in previous
response, that Stafford's real abuse of Harner is quite plain for anyone to see.
He implicitly accuses Harner of the same thing he accuses everyone else who
differs from Arian theology-their personal belief in the Trinity precludes them
from accepting their own evidence. So although he would never label Harner an
Arian, he continues to use his research to promote his fallacious understanding
of John 1:1c.
Now we live in an era of pseudo mea culpa. Do we really need another
pseudo-confession of an alleged crime which was never committed (accusing
Stafford/JWs of accusing Harner of being an Arian), or an evasion by
equivocating on what is meant by misuse/abuse of Harner to Stafford's own
definition of abuse (the claim that Trinitarians affirm that Stafford/JWs affirm
Harner is an Arian, rather than simply that his research is abused), or
admitting to charges that were never labeled against JWs in the first place (no
one ever accused Stafford/JWs of saying Harner was an Arian)? What Stafford
finds patently difficult to admit is the charge to which he is blatantly guilty
of-namely, using Harner to promote the silly notion that qualitativeness always
includes the semantic idea of indefiniteness!
STAFFORD
2) Hartley claims he "could have" spent more time on this and that, and I have
no doubt that he could have done so. But when you get it wrong who cares how
much time you 'spend' on it? Trinitarians need to back away from themselves and
stop thinking that whenever they "respond" to something that their response is
the final word, etc. Time and time again they write replies that really contain
no substantive argumentation, and which are usually accompanied by terrible
misunderstandings of basic Bible teachings, due to their fealty to the creeds.
Additionally, what they do write often argues against the very point they seek
to prove! More on this below.
RESPONSE
I assume "basic Bible teaching" is that of the Watchtower? I do hold to the
basic truths of the creeds but this is a red herring as it pertains to my study.
Anyone who reads my article without an Arian ax to grind will see this quite
clearly. To my knowledge I never mention the creeds in the article. But Stafford
is content to brush off the lexical, grammatical and statistical study and lead
readers on a wild goose chase. Framing my study in Trinitarian terms amounts to
nothing more than a caricature. On the contrary it is Stafford's idea of "basic
Bible teaching" that seems to predispose him to reject my results. Furthermore,
I have yet to find one legitimate criticism of the study itself.
Now, how much time can be spent on writing when you've gotten it wrong? The
answer is how much time it took to write 373 pages I suppose.
STAFFORD
3) Hartley misleadingly claims that "Jehovah's Witnesses consistently cite him
as confirming their understanding that qualitativeness (Q) =
indefinite-qualitative (I-Q or Q-I)." Again, we do no such thing. We merely cite
him in response to the claim that THEOS in John 1:1c is definite, which is a
claim that trinitarians have abused for decades, and in support of what we see
as a qualitative emphasis for THEOS in 1:1c. See below for more on this point.
RESPONSE
I claimed earlier that their use of Harner consisted in (1) denying definiteness
to theos, (2) affirming that theos is qualitative, which is (3) always taken to
invariably include indefiniteness. The logical deduction is obvious and clear.
This is how Stafford takes Harner and how he abuses his study. My comments above
are a conclusive statement and how Stafford maintains he does not abuse Harner's
category. My study excludes any possible way of equivocating Q to be I-Q (Q-I).
But more about that below.
Stafford continues to deny the obvious. He quotes me: "The fallacy we wished to
expose is that while we acknowledge a semantic category of I-Q, we deny that
this somehow infers that Q = I-Q or that there is no such thing as Q apart from
I (indefiniteness)."
STAFFORD
Could you please cite the examples you give in your article that you feel most
strongly support the above assertion? Could you also point out where in my book
there is a claim to the effect that "there is no such thing as Q apart from I
(indefiniteness)"?
RESPONSE
To the first part. How could there be examples in my article that support the
above assertion if I have just stated that the above assertion is incorrect? Now
if he intends to question whether I can give examples where a noun is purely
qualitative and no indefiniteness is involved the answer is clear-namely, ALL
MASS NOUNS! Again his failure to come to grips with the nature of mass nouns is
patently clear. To ask for an example is its own demonstration of his inability
to grasp the implications of mass lexis. For a complete list of mass nouns that
occur in PN constructions in the NT one can consult my Thesis (98-100) where I
list 61 class A nouns, 25 class B nouns, and 6 class C nouns-none of which carry
the indefinite semantic.
All such denials by Stafford that he doesn't use Harner's study for affirming an
indefinite sense to qualitativeness should be met with a great deal of
skepticism. My suspicion is that he will continue to define for himself what
abuse entails and claim there is no abuse going on all the while continuing the
abuse.
On the second issue. Where does Stafford claim to the effect that there is no
such thing as Q apart from I? I have already demonstrated where he denies this
above in his abuse of Harner. Further, his response to what a mass noun is
semantically has confirmed it (remember the idea of semantic signaling?). In his
book he lists no noun having the semantic nuance of Q-d (Q).
But let me offer an invitation to Stafford. Is he willing to admit of a semantic
category of qualitativeness independent of indefiniteness? And if willing, is he
able to produce an example? If he is willing only to admit of the possibility,
then I would like to be given an example of a possibility in his mind, not
simply told that he merely admit of the possibility without giving any.
Stafford quotes me further,
"Admittedly, Harner opened up the semantic domain to include such a category of
which previous (Colwell) and later (Dixon) studies have not fully acknowledged.
Our study grants the semantic tag as well as five other distinct domains (D, I,
Q, D-Q, Q-d, I-Q)."
STAFFORD
None of the above has anything to do with my passing remarks on your article, so
why are you repeating what we already know from reading what you have said?
Please refocus.
RESPONSE
I find this (rhetorical?) question difficult to swallow in light of the fact of
Stafford's failure to take responsibility for his abuse of Harner's work. The
linkage of his understanding of John 1:1c and Harner is undeniable, although I'm
sure he will continue to deny it in the manner he has done thus far. It is hard
to tell, based on what Stafford says, that he has fully comprehended (if not
completely read) my study. Therefore, it is necessary at least to remind him and
others just what the real rather than imagined issues are.
Stafford cites me, "Further, it is not clear in his [Harner's] article that Q
does exist apart from I, but this is not explicitly stated. A fair reading of
his study, then, should leave the matter outside the realm of certainty in
regards to that insistence."
STAFFORD
Can you give examples from Harner's article where he is somehow unclear about
this? Also, again, you're talking about something (namely, how Harner's analysis
can be used) that does not deal with my approach to this subject. See below.
RESPONSE
See my article fn 48 where I document how Harner could be misconstrued on this
matter. My point is that Harner himself does not explicitly distinguish the
categories of Q and Q-I (I-Q). That is my point. I have no doubt that he holds
to a category of Q apart from I but it is not clear beyond a doubt in his
article. Now I would like Stafford to show where Harner is clear on this issue.
And if he is clear on this, why then does Stafford reject it as a distinct
semantic category?
He cites me again, "In other words, what can be known is that Harner understood
that I and Q were not inimical to each other. At times a noun included both
nuances with qualitativeness taking priority."
STAFFORD
Is this a new point to anyone here?
RESPONSE
What is apparently not understood by Stafford, is that Harner made this
statement in opposition to a scholarly consensus that viewed these categories as
practically incompatible since Colwell. Even the subsequent study of Dixon
denied the blending of categories that Harner granted. The situation is reversed
with Stafford. He understands these categories as indivisibly united! What might
be new to Stafford is the very point that mass nouns seem to contribute to the
semantic discussion-there is a semantic category of quality that excludes the
notion of and is not bound up with indefiniteness. This is a repeated theme on
my part but a consistently denied fact on Stafford's.
He cites me again, "It is illogical and absurd, however, to insist that whenever
Q as a semantic category is invoked, indefiniteness must be by necessity a part
of the semantic package."
STAFFORD
Thank you for telling us that. Now, I have two requests: 1) Where do I make such
a claim, and 2) please provide, for purposes of discussion and illustration,
what you consider clear examples of purely qualitative count nouns, in an
anarthrous precopulative position.
RESPONSE
Need I refer back to his "semantic signaling" in demonstrating his antagonism to
this idea? It should be remembered that Stafford does not affirm the semantic
category that my study proves exists. Having denied the category he later turns
around and limits its existence to the mass noun an admission that is
detrimental to his view. But then he turns this into a "semantic signaling" of a
count noun, thus denying that the mass noun is really exclusively qualitative
(see earlier discussion). He then asks somewhat oddly for an example of a
qualitative count noun that exhibits this qualitative feature! But how can he
ask for a demonstration of a count noun exhibiting a semantic category that he
refuses to acknowledge exists for mass nouns? In addition to this he also
questions the concept of transferring the semantic category (Q-d) from the mass
noun to the count noun (Q). I might note here that it is not strictly a
transferal but the creation of a semantic category to which count nouns could
also exhibit that we have in mind. Now there is nothing theoretically
prohibiting a singular count noun from this semantic notion.
Now if Stafford is willing to concede not only the truth of my statements above,
and not only the possibility of purely qualitative nouns but also their
actuality in mass nouns, this discussion would be much furthered. But up till
now, he has been unwilling in any of these points to acquiesce. As for clear
examples, the chart at the end of the article listed them. Isn't his request
just begging for a repeat here?
Now just a quick point on what makes up a clearly qualitative count noun. As I
illustrated above it is perfectly viable to understand a count noun as purely
qualitative, i.e., to exhibit the same semantic nuance of a mass noun. For
example, one can say, "God is a Spirit" (I, I-Q [Q-I]) or "God is Spirit" (Q)among
several other options where the nominal "Spirit" is a singular count noun (John
4:24). I would consider this text a clear instance of the Q nuance. This passage
is excluded in my study because I considered only those references with explicit
rather than implied EIMI verbs. Nevertheless the implied mental placement of the
verb appears almost certain to be between the two nominatives-thus amounting to
a proposition in an implied Colwell construction. At any rate, the lexeme
determines it to be a count noun while the context demands that this noun be
taken as purely qualitative. It is a statement on the nature of God-God is
Spirit. God is not simply a Spirit relegated to spatial confines or a member of
a class of other spirits. God is Spirit in the sense of omnipresence, an
attribute essential to the statement and exclusively bound to His essence. No
other being shares this feature therefore no other beings can be inferred to
which class He would be a member. So here is an example where the qualitative
feature is exhibited in which no class of other "spirits" may be inferred who
are not at the same time and in the same sense God.
To utilize "semantic signaling" we would reason that because God is Spirit, he
must be of the class of spirits. Since he is of the class he must be a Spirit.
Therefore the noun would be I-Q (Q-I). But this reasoning, as noted above, is
the type of nonsense that should be avoided. The reference to extralingual
referents is extraneous to the context that demands otherwise. Moreover, if
there are other spirits who share the quality of omnipresence then there are
many gods or Gods! Surely one cannot equivocate on the term "spirit" here and
reach any other consensus. At a bare minimum, omnipresence is included in the
referent to which the term spirit refers. Thus PNEUMA is used here to point to
the divine nature to which no other extralingual agent shares. This example at
least shows that other members need not be inferred simply because quality is
under discussion-in fact all but God are excluded. God shares a quality that no
other beings share. This then is a clear instance where a personal noun is used
in a qualitative sense to refer to an attribute (or attributes) of God and is a
much clearer parallel to John 1:1c than Stafford's Acts 28:4 (JWD, 207-8). There
are other "murderers" who murder but no other Spirit who has omnipresence.
Whereas determining the semantic notion of mass nouns is simply a matter of
identifying them lexically, the precarious nature of singular count nouns is not
their lexical identity but their semantic elasticity. Thus determining their
specific nuance is a delicate exegetical task. But to a priori exclude the
category of Q (equivalent to Q-d) as a semantic possibility is illegitimate,
unwarranted and an unjustified ruse. Moreover, when one has included rather than
precluded it as a semantic possibility the determination of its probability then
rests on clear instances of its occurrence in specific texts. Each corpus of
writing must undergo separate tabulations in order to build up probabilistic
predilections for disputed texts like John 1:1c. This is why the generic whole
cannot determine the a point which Stafford continues to misrepresent in my
study. It is this kind of procedure that helps eliminate the influence of
subjective inclinations, theological bias and appeal to extralinguistic factors
that taint the results.
STAFFORD
And my study illustrated its probability, in several areas, most of which you
completely avoided. See pages 206-209 of my book, for example.
RESPONSE
Re-reading Stafford's pages, I find no statistical argument for the probability
of the view he indicates. Instead I find a theological argument couched in the
either-or fallacy on page either you believe Jesus is a god distinct from the
Father (noted by the prepositional phrase, PROS TON THEON) or believe in
Sabellianism. "There is no other way around it [this conundrum]" he says (JWD,
210). Incidentally, he admits that O THEOS in John 1:1 refers to the Father but
denies the personal distinction. "We agree that ho theos is the Father, but
since John is careful to distinguish the being of the Father . . . from that of
the Word, we must also do so in our translation of this passage" (JDW, 220). How
Stafford maintains that this necessarily distinguishes between beings and in the
next breath argues that the anarthrous THEOS cannot refer to this true God but
another being in the attempt to avoid modalism, fails to understand that his
argument is circular and proceeds upon false premises. It is, if I may so say,
an example of reading later Arian theology into the text!
But if it is admitted that TON THEON refers to the Father-an undeniable personal
epithet, then the pre-copulative anarthrous occurrence in 1:1c is indubitably to
be understood as purely qualitative designation of being which is unequivocally
applied to the person of the Word. The only other alternatives are to introduce
polytheism (or di-theism) or equivocation of the noun theos. Thus the deduction
is quite apparent to anyone without an Arian bias to see. It is certainly more
reasonable to assert personal (which cannot be denied) rather than ontological
distinction within the Godhead rather than posit the creation of a god, the term
of which suffers equivocation to less than the characteristics of its previous
reference. Admittedly, every being maintains a personal distinction with other
beings, but the converse of this is not necessarily true. Every personal
distinction does not demand an ontological addition. Stafford apparently and
perhaps unwittingly uses a one to one correspondence view of humans (1 person =
1 being) as a model for interpreting John 1:1 and affirming his Arian theology.
This is a fundamental error on his part that is not new. Both Arians and
Modalists have historically been linked to this type of error. If the grammar
points otherwise-and my study indicated that it does- then Arian presuppositions
must be brushed aside. At any rate, I find no convincing grammatical rationale
for accepting either his view nor for the translation of the passage he offers.
STAFFORD
In your article, under the section, What is a Qualitative Noun? you claim:
"Thus count nouns by definition are nouns which can be semantically
indefinitized and semantically pluralized. Therefore, in contrast to mass nouns,
which cannot be indefinite in any sense, count nouns proffer the possibility of
being purely qualitative like mass nouns."
Yet, NOWHERE do you interact with the examples that allegedly support your view
of such a possibility (see my reference to your Appendix below)!
RESPONSE
The article simply presented the results of my study which passages are argued
in more detail in the thesis. Stafford's real problem, again, is the purely
qualitative noun, especially the possibility of its application to the singular
count noun. He simply doesn't accept the possibility that a singular count noun
can exhibit the semantics of a mass noun nor the semantic nuance of mass nouns
for that matter quite despite the evidence. But if one consults the quote (of
mine) above he will note that all I affirm is the mere possibility of a semantic
nuance that happens to exist for the mass noun for the singular count noun. Why
does he not even admit of the possibility? He seems precluded from such by other
than grammatical reasons.
STAFFORD
And some of you wonder why I am always claiming that you misrepresent me. Well,
it's because you do. I think this is about the tenth time you have intimated or
directly stated that I have "insisted" that Q = I-Q (Q-I). I will no longer take
you seriously until you explain from where you are getting this "wrong-headed"
view.
RESPONSE
So is it a misrepresentation of Stafford on my part to consistently indicate
that Stafford always understands Q to be I-Q (Q-I)? If it is then I wish he
would give me instances to disprove this allegation. Furthermore, is the
indissoluble connection Stafford makes (Q = I-Q) really necessary to document? I
might turn the readers attention back to what he calls "semantic signaling" as
proof of his aversion to Q-d. Is Stafford therefore willing to admit that Q not
= I-Q (Q-I)? Is he willing to acquiesce to the semantic category of mass nouns?
Is he willing to admit of the possibility of that same semantic nuance being
attributed to singular count nouns? If he admits that Q = I-Q is wrongheaded,
and I certainly agree that it is, then he would surely be on his way towards
understanding how a semantic category is not restricted merely to one type of
lexeme-it is simply established by one. On supposedly misrepresentation, I
should think that Stafford would not equivocate on his own views clearly set
forth in his book and postings. If not, then one could only wish that he would
simply admit that there is a category of Q that doesn't entail indefiniteness
and give examples (rather than mere lip service) of cases where this category
applies from his perspective.
STAFFORD
Explain to us all, please, how demonstrating something as true for a mass noun,
"opens up the feasibility of the transferal of that semantic category to other
nouns (count) which do have the prospect of indefiniteness without necessarily
latching the latter semantic tag with it"?
RESPONSE
I have already demonstrated this above and examples from English could be
multiplied ad infinitum. The reader should be reminded that Stafford is arguing
past what he admits to accepting. He does not accept the semantic nuance of Q-d.
So the question he asks comes across as a bit disingenuous. Nevertheless, we
still might ask, What stops the application of a semantic category established
by one lexeme from having access to another type of lexeme? To outright deny it,
as Stafford does, is done a priori rather than a posteriori. What reasons are
there for rejecting any semantic category, let alone this one, to any lexeme
when that domain has been demonstrated to exist? I sense a bit of desperation
here on Stafford's part, but this isn't the first time.
STAFFORD
I know you list I-Q examples in your Appendix, but I want you to explain how
"The member as well as the characteristics of that member are equally stressed."
Just giving examples and failing to interact with them hardly proves your point.
RESPONSE
The phrase "equally stressed" is perhaps overdrawn. Let me explain. In coming to
rest on distinct semantic categories (I/I-Q) it was questionable whether to make
a finer distinction between I-Q and Q-I. My thinking went back and forth on this
when I worked through my thesis and I finally settled with excluding one (thus
making them equal [I-Q = Q-I]) and simply retaining two categories where an
indefinite nuance was an issue (I and I/Q). My choice here was to bypass
attempting to make too fine a distinction in whether quality was emphasized more
than the membership of the class or whether the individual was stressed over the
qualities-although practically I did just that. This scheme, however, in no way
militated against the indefinite category as having qualities in the
background-in fact I have argued that every indefinite noun has qualities to
some extent. In this way I could affirm when quality was an issue (I-Q) and when
it was not an issue (I). On this matter I am flexible, having determined these
two tags for more pragmatic reasons. However, if it helps for one to think of
the I-Q category as Q-I and the I category as I-Q and omit completely the I
category it would be acceptable. However, to be consistent, I will retain the
tags that I started out with. On this matter, and maybe this is the only one,
Stafford and I would probably be in agreement.
One example of what I have labeled as I-Q other than John's Gospel can be found
in Matthew 14:26 (cf. Mk 6:49). The incident involves Jesus walking on the sea.
The disciples spot him and exclaim, "He is (or "It is") a ghost!" This is a
singular count noun as indicated by its capacity to take a plural form and the
ability to be indefinitized. Thus the lexeme determines its categorizing into
either mass or count. It is impossible to imagine quality as a non-factor.
Context indicates the very purpose for the exclamation was based on the
characteristics exuded by the appearance of Jesus walking on the water-an
evidence/inference type of reasoning on the disciples part. But, although it is
in the Colwell construction, an indefinite sense is also deemed as a necessary
semantic component. Qualitativeness does not automatically entail
indefiniteness, but one must still ask if that is the case, or whether context
argues for this idea. Jesus wasn't simply ghost or ghost-like (Q), or some
functional equivalent, but rather the disciples thought it or he was a ghost
(I-Q; cf. Acts 12:15-an example of an articular pre-copulative PN)-thus the
inference of other members is evident. The objectivity of the event in a
referential aspect seems to add in confirming the indefinite sense as well. Thus
both ideas are stressed. Whether this emphasis is equal or not is difficult to
determine, but to omit quality from the forefront of the meaning seems to
detract a very important semantic feature to the passage. Both are equally
stressed in the sense that neither takes priority over the other whereas in the
indefinite sense, qualitativeness takes a back seat. Thus when indefiniteness is
involved in a count noun, quality is either near (I-Q) or remote (I). It is
impossible to have indefiniteness without this additional semantic involved
somehow, but the converse of this is not true (Q-d/Q not = I-Q).
STAFFORD
Stafford quotes me as saying, "Qualitative (Q). The qualities, nature or essence
of concepts, beings or things are stressed. It is usually associated with one
member and usually without reference to class. Only singular count nouns that
are qualitative will fall within this category."
Again, no examples are given. Also, when an example is presented, which I am
sure you will be able to do, clearly explain to us how the "essence" is
stressed, and how the count noun in the example is excluded from membership in
the class.
RESPONSE
The section to which he refers to has very good reason for not including
examples. It wasn't the purpose of the section! The purpose of the section was
simply to define the semantic categories and indicate where mass and count nouns
fit within that scheme. For arguments and interactions with texts one will have
to consult the thesis. The purpose of the article was to summarize the results
and detail the process that led to these results.
Since this involves singular count nouns I simply need to refer to my previous
examples given in this response. "John is human" and "John is a man" can both
use the same Greek word ANTHROPOS for either but mean different things. Because
an inference ("semantic signaling") can be derived from "John is human" to "John
is a human being" it is still not legitimate to read back into the first
statement an I-Q sense. It is clearly Q alone. The inference to I-Q is just
that, an inference based on extralingual considerations. This then is an example
where one singular count noun can refer either to qualities alone or an
individual. Stating that "John is human" and indicating that "human" is the
qualities to which are bound up with John no more makes humanity in general
impersonal than does saying THEOS in John 1:1c makes God a category because it
is used in this way. To reply, "Humanity is not a category!" is quite beside the
point of whether it can be used in a qualitative sense. The words (symbols)
themselves can be used in these ways to refer to either idea. Again, to say "God
is Spirit" and "God is a Spirit" are two different uses of the noun. By
indicating the first as qualitative neither puts God within the category of
other spirits nor denigrates the referent of "Spirit" to less than personal
because the nominal is used in this fashion. Personal PNs do not necessarily
militate against its use as a category or qualities describing a person referred
to. To admit that nominals, even THEOS can be used this way is a major step in
overcoming the problem in John 1:1c. If certain less theologically loaded terms
can be used this way, why not THEOS? Part of Stafford's problem is his inability
to differentiate between symbol and referent of that symbol.
STAFFORD
Examples proving "It has unique referential identity without reference to
quality or nature" would be helpful. Please explain and illustrate your
examples.
RESPONSE
Stafford is referring to the "D" (definite) category where I state that here no
qualities are in mind. These references usually include two kinds of statements.
The first involve tautologies like "The one who has the bride is the bridegroom"
(John 3:29) and the second involve proper names-although even with the latter
John appears to intend, by his placement of Abraham and Elijah in the
pre-copulative position, some qualitative connotations (Jn 1:21a; 8:39a; cf.
1:25b in post-copulative). Testing whether these are indeed definite involves
converting the proposition and seeing if this necessarily entails the other. If
one can necessarily affirm the consequent from the antecedent, or the antecedent
from the consequent, then it is a definite proposition. If the PN has
connotations associated with it (titles especially) then D-Q is the tag
attached.
STAFFORD
I THINK Hartley believes the "I" in the above quote is me. But he is wrong. The
only words that I added to Al's appendix are those that are italicized and in
brackets. Al compiled the list and added the paragraphs that follow. In my
second edition there will be an expanded discussion that will illustrate the
importance of the context in classifying such nouns, though I have already
illustrated this in my Chapter 7.
RESPONSE
Although it is true that I associated the "I" with Stafford, it hardly
exonerates him of the grievous error his appendix fosters and to which he
agrees. In addition it should be apparent how erroneous it is to attempt a
classification of nouns based on "context." Until Stafford returns to the lexeme
alone in classifying nouns as either mass or count, his enterprise will continue
to be riddled with subjectivity and imprecision.
STAFFORD
Near the end of his article Hartley says, "In other words, the clear semantic of
the mass or plural count noun, is meant to disambiguate the semantics of the
singular count noun to which it is related in the discourse. We believe the best
example of this occurs in John 1:1 with John 1:14. Therefore we add,
tentatively, a final argument for the purely qualitative aspect to the PN in the
phrase KAI THEOS HN O LOGOS. Thus, Jesus is God in every sense that the Father
is."
How the use of a count noun in 1:1c and a mass noun in 1:14 supports his view of
a purely qualitative classification for the count noun in 1:1c is not stated,
but assumed. Of course, when Hartley says that "Jesus is God in every sense that
the Father is" he imports a post-biblical understanding for the term THEOS into
the NT text, along with the distinctions between "person" and "being" that are
essential to his view, but not articulated in Scripture. Indeed, as we have
discussed many times, what the Bible does say and how it uses the terms "person"
and "being" are in direct contradiction to trinitarianism.
RESPONSE
There are several objectionable statements here in Stafford's reply. Let me
highlight a few. First he claims that linking the mass noun SARX and the
semantic nuance connected with it to John 1:1c in confirming the Q semantic
nuance of the singular count noun THEOS is not stated but assumed. There are
several stated reasons why the noun in John 1:1c is to be understood as purely
qualitative. The first is the statistical study in John of singular count nouns.
It is simply the most probable semantic domain to be attached. The second is its
discourse connection to John 1:14. The structure of these passages are
deliberately construed so as to be connected. This is spelled out in the
article.
To put a lexically qualitative noun (mass) in the Colwell construction is an odd
phenomenon to begin with especially when considering that there would be no
difference in meaning in 1:14 if the PN were to be placed on the post-copulative
side of the sentence. One is lead, due to its invariable semantic nuance, to
question its precopulative placement. The chiasm of subjects and the Colwell
construction connects it directly to John 1:1. Therefore, since the mass noun is
put within a construction for reasons of making a connection to John 1:1c, and
since in John a precopulative anarthrous singular count noun is predominately Q
anyway, it seems reasonable to conclude that this discourse feature is an added
element in confirming that semantic nuance designed to disambiguate the meaning
even further in case one has not grasped it till now. Thus the passage is marked
by an identical formula forming a semantic inclusion. Now these elements were
all mentioned in the article, thus it is quite disingenuous to state that the
view is not stated but assumed. There are other instances in John's gospel where
this type of phenomenon occurs and that is also mentioned in the article. Thus
the "Word was God" and the "Word became flesh" offer identical semantic nuances
to the PN affirming the dual nature of Jesus. He is God in every sense the
Father is, and he is human in every sense we are-minus sin of course. If
anything the latter idea marks a heightening rather than a lessening of the
meaning associated with the PN.
The second issue relates to importing a post-biblical theology into the text. It
is clear that confronting the evidence as I have laid it out, one would be led
inevitably to concur that at the very least I am following where the data leads
me if not also with the soundness of my conclusions. I am quite convinced, on
the other hand, that an awful lot of hurdles and ignoring of evidence added to a
heap of flawed methodology and subjectivity reeking with post-biblical Arian
presuppositions are the only elements that would lead one to reject these
conclusions and follow Stafford's course. Furthermore, it is patently clear who
is operating from and appealing to a post-biblical theology. As for me, I came
to the conclusion that "Jesus is God in every sense as the Father is" because of
the grammatical study not because of a theological ax.
STAFFORD
Hartley also fails to recognize that while SARX is, lexically speaking, a mass
noun, it is a semantic signal for a count noun, namely, a human being! A lot of
what Hartley says and the distinctions he makes relates to his failure to
appreciate the need to carefully consider the context of the words under
consideration. Again, we will present an extended discussion of this point in my
second edition and further reveal the shortcomings of Hartley's nonsensical
rejection of the context.
RESPONSE
We have already addressed this issue above. But consider the translation to
which Stafford would have if his idea is followed through: "The Word became a
flesh." If we use the semantic equivalent to flesh the sentence should read,
"The word became human" not "a human." Although the deduction from the
proposition is admissible it is not what the proposition states and is not to be
read back into the proposition itself as both pointing to and entailing its
semantic "signal" which can only be described as some type of illegitimate
totality transfer. Furthermore, John's way of indicating that a person is a man
or a human is to use the noun ANTHROPOS not SARX (1:6). Thus Stafford's
"semantic signaling" is a dubious process to say the least. The only way to
conclude that Jesus became a human is to logically infer that from the
proposition "The Word became human." And to do that is to admit of the semantic
Q-d that I have argued for and to which Stafford denies.
But what does Stafford imply by admitting that SARX is a mass noun? Is he
acquiescing to the semantic nuance of mass nouns as Q-d? How does he arrive at
the idea that Jesus became a human without assuming from the original
proposition the semantic nuance of pure quality?
To my comments on determining mass/count on lexis rather than context Stafford
replies:
STAFFORD
Hartley has no legitimate basis upon which to make such a statement. But, again,
the fact that he cannot see through the lexical tagging of SARX in John 1:14 as
a mass noun, to its semantic signaling of a count noun, shows that his
statistically-driven study leaves much to be desired.
RESPONSE
The legitimate basis is clearly laid out in the article and the thesis. His
appeal to lexical tagging and semantic signaling seems to me an evasive maneuver
to avoid the obvious. Furthermore, even granting these factors does not warrant
an illegitimate totality transfer into the PN. As I have illustrated earlier,
this leads to some silly ideas.
STAFFORD
I would like Hartley to explain where in the above list we find an example of a
qualitative noun that does not at the same time involve membership in a class.
Again, I am not, nor have I ever said that such is not possible, but I want
Hartley to at least try and make a case for his claim, even though he has badly
misunderstood what I have said on this issue.
RESPONSE
Stafford's question is a bit ambiguous. The issue concerns at what point in the
process is a class conceived as well as the logical procedure leading up to
this. This in turn is entirely contingent upon the type of noun under
discussion. There is not a question of whether qualitative nouns (Q-d or Q)
could or eventually conjure up a class, but at what point and what kind of class
is implied. If mass nouns eventually conjure up a class, as Stafford himself
insists, why wouldn't singular count nouns mimicking the semantic nuance of the
mass noun eventually conjure up a class? If a class is eventually conjured up
does this somehow demand an indefinite nuance to the PN? The answer is No.
If Stafford can see "a man" from a mass noun in John 1:14 through lexical
tagging and semantic signaling, and infers from this that the noun is I-Q, I
almost shudder to see what type of creature will emerge within a discussion on
singular count nouns. The approach to singular count nouns presupposes that one
understands, first of all, the semantic nuance of the mass noun. It is no wonder
that Stafford has trouble with singular count nouns after denying the
possibility of Q without I. Q means qualities not necessarily class. Count nouns
that directly represent class are plural (slaves, men, disciples, etc.). Now one
can infer from qualities a class or from class qualities, but it is a leap to
reason that a qualitative noun refers to a class and the subject to which it
modifies is a member of that class and therefore the PN is an indefinite noun.
If the subject is a member of the class to which the PN depicts the qualities
of, then the PN is not indefinite but rather the subject. It is as silly as
inferring from the sentence with a plural PN, "Boys and girls are slaves" to
"Boys are a slaves" or "Boys are a slave" simply because "slaves" represents the
class to which boys and girls belong.
The issue with singular count nouns is not that a category cannot be found, but
whether it should be sought and whether the inferences should be subsequently
loaded into the term. In some instances a category can be inferred as the above
discussion clearly indicates. But it is inferred simply because the PN referred
to has the characteristics of the category to which the subject belongs. In
other instances the qualities themselves are monadic, applying to one being only
and no class of beings are to be inferred per se. With the sentence "John is
human" it is perfectly right to infer that there are other humans. But even with
other members we do not infer a lesser or greater degree inhumanness with John
or those of whose class he belongs to. He might be a different human being, but
he is not a lesser human being. Incidentally, we are never told by an
authoritative source that there is only 1 human being. But we are told there is
only one true God. And if the Word is God, then he cannot be identical in
Godness unless he is the same God. Are there other Gods of the same
characteristics as God? Linguistically, this is the only other conclusion to
John 1:1c. Not that Jesus is a god, but that Jesus is God. The implications of
Colwell's original thesis would make this statement convertible and end up with
Modalism. At least he does not equivocate and thus depreciate the term itself.
The purely qualitative sense would maintain the distinction between the Father
and the Word but unite them in Godness. Thus Jesus is not a god any more than
the Father is a god. They are both God in personal distinction from each
other-what I have called a co-hyponymic relationship to THEOS of a contiguitous
nature.
In John 1:1 to indicate "The Word is God" in the sense the study points to is
not to infer that the Word is a god but rather the Word retains the qualities or
characteristics of God that make God God. The Word is not distinguished from the
being of God in 1:1a as with the person of the Father who is God. As indicated
earlier, Stafford admits that it is the Father to whom TON THEON refers to in
John 1:1a. It is to the personal distinction, therefore, that PROS points to not
the essence or being of God the Father. Nothing warrants an ontological
distinction but an Arian horizon dictating to the text what it cannot say.
Furthermore, to insist that the Word exhibits less than the characteristics
implied in the use of THEOS is to make an unwarranted equivocation. That idea
assumes that no personal distinction is possible between members of the Godhead
unless it also includes an ontological disjunction-thus some absolute solitary
unity is maintained with God along with the notion that 1 person = 1 being-a
fallacy alluded to earlier. If a class is proposed where THEOS is that class to
which the Word and Father belong, then it consists not of beings but
persons-thus the translation "God" (Q) is to be preferred over "a God" (I-Q).
This purely qualitative nuance is perfectly applicable and linguistically in
keeping with the nature of PNs used in John's gospel.
STAFFORD
Stafford quotes me. Of course, he does admit: "The problem with these statistics
is when exegetically significant passages are determined from them. For example,
John 1:1 uses EIMI with a singular count noun. Using the above statistics alone
would mean the text would support the Jehovah's Witnesses and their
interpretation of that passage."
Hartley then concludes: "The citation from my article is a good and typical
example of Stafford's misuse of the research of others and misquotation for
purposes hardly commensurate with a pursuit of truth. The out of context quote
is demonstrated by the nature of the very next sentence in the article, which he
conveniently fails to call any reader's attention to. It reads as follows. . ."
RESPONSE
Once again Stafford fails to quote it. For anyone who reads the article and his
handling of this citation, it will be patently clear that Stafford deliberately
seeks to misstate others to his own advantage. Again, here are the next few
sentences:
"However, below we demonstrate a contextually closer concentric circle to John
1:1 that is more determinative in it's interpretation than this statistical
phenomenon regarding the entire NT. Therefore, it is wise to reserve a semantic
judgment until the book from which the verse arises has been statistically
tallied. So although it is true that the predominant semantic for a singular
count noun minus all definitizing factors in a pre-copulative anarthrous PN
construct with EIMI is statistically higher for the I-Q category, this is not
the entire case for each book or author of the NT."
But Stafford omits this for reasons of deliberate misconstrual of the evidence.
STAFFORD
Again, Hartley fails to appreciate a rather obvious point, namely, I am merely
making reference to his article and conveying points, in passing, to an
"Observer," relating to things I would be considering in my reply, and which he
should also consider. Hartley seizes upon this in order to make some point, I
guess, but it only serves to underscore his desperation.
RESPONSE
This response for his irresponsible citation is itself irresponsible. I suppose
the "Observer" indicated in his response are those who have not read the article
and are left to depend on his misrepresentation of my statements to find out
what I mean. Had these observers simply read the abused section it would be
quite apparent how disingenuous Stafford is on this point. But he regards this
as something I should consider. What does he mean by this? Is it the practice of
misstating and caricature that I am to consider? Is it his ability to totally
ignore the next sentence that contradicts the meaning he wishes to convey that I
should consider? And how should I consider it? It is Stafford who attempts to
illegitimately seize upon something in a desperate attempt to turn my study into
a self-refutation. I guess the "obvious point" he wished to convey is that it is
OK to turn clear passages intent on saying one thing into another for his own
ends. This is a proven tactic of Stafford. He does it to Harner and others, it
should be to no surprise that he is at it again. But it is a tactic others
should be warned not to emulate.
STAFFORD
Hartley should stop taking me out of context and claiming that I am somehow
"using" his research inappropriately. I assume he knew that I was not going to
quote his entire article, or even any qualifying paragraphs, in my passing
remarks, since they were merely intended to highlight points that I believe he
ultimately fails to properly appreciate. Hartley, feel free to assume that I do
not believe YOUR qualifying statements necessarily make the point you want them
to.
RESPONSE
It is one thing to demand someone quote a whole article and quite another to
fail to issue the very next sentence that militates against the very meaning one
wishes to propagate to "Others" that violate that original intent. Now how is it
that I fail to appreciate the very point I myself made? It is one thing for
Stafford to disagree with the point being made in the following sentence but to
misrepresent it as he did is irresponsible. The next sentences in the article,
and the point to which I presume he thinks does not make the point to which he
agrees with, concerns the methodology of determining the semantic nuance of the
singular count noun THEOS in John 1:1c. I simply noted that the generic whole
(NT) cannot determine the parts (GJohn). For that matter, the parts cannot
determine the whole! This latter problem is fostered by studies of Dixon and
Harner. Not that they did this, but their studies on John or Mark cannot
legitimately be transferred to 1 Timothy or any other NT book. This is an axiom
in any grammatical study. One author uses constructions differently than other
writers or with slight semantic modifications. Thus determinations of disputed
texts must be made from the authors own usage as close to the text as possible.
One would think that Stafford's insistence on "context" would presuppose he
knows this. Yet this is the point of which Stafford apparently disagrees! It is
irrelevant if Stafford does not "believe [my] qualifying statements necessarily
make the point [I] want them to." They certainly do not make the point he infers
they do. He is free to disagree with this axiomatic hermeneutical procedure, but
not to pretend that I do.
I make comments about his use of the indefinite sense to THEOS in John 1:1c in
my first response to Stafford.
STAFFORD
If you are looking for a meaningless reply, look no further than the above.
Listen to what he is saying! The fact that the Word is THEOS and distinct from
hO THEOS "isn't grammatically determined, but it is rather a theologically
motivated construal of 'context'"? Actually, I state the grammatical reasons for
my view quite clearly, as they relate the clear distinction made in the text
through the use of the article and the preposition PROS. Hartley has absolutely
no basis for his view, which is unabashedly read back into the text even though
it contradicts it.
RESPONSE
Again Stafford is off reading his own meanings into my comments. I made mention
that John 1:1c did not demand the indefinite sense to which Stafford insists. I
asked, "What demands it?" My answer to my own question was that the translation
"a god" was not made on grammatical grounds but rather from his Arian horizon
that demanded this sense. The distinction between the Word and the Father
(referred to as TON THEON-a point to which Stafford admits) is not what is
denied on my part. What is denied is that Stafford assumes this is an
ontological distinction rather than a personal one. It is his Arian theology
that determines this not grammar. Furthermore, to say that the Word is distinct
from the Father (TON THEON) is not the same as saying that the Father (TON THEON)
is distinct from THEOS-another assumption Stafford unwittingly makes The very
fact that THEOS is in the Colwell construction is not to make a personal
distinction between the Word and the Father. It is to emphasize the quality of
the LOGOS who is personally distinct from the Father who exhibits the same
qualities embodied in THEOS (thus Q not I-Q). Both have the characteristics of
THEOS because both are THEOS. THEOS is not distinct from the Father, but
incorporates both the Father and the Word. Each is not part THEOS but each are
THEOS. Stafford proposes an indefinite sense then based on this presumption
proceeds to equivocate on the very word THEOS in flat contradiction to its
previous usage. The meaningless reply, therefore, is confined to his demand that
THEOS is distinct from the Father, defined differently than its previous
reference and demands an indefinite sense based on grammatical reasons. All of
these reasons are bogus.
STAFFORD
"God" is not a category, but a person, the Father. (1 Cor. 8:6) There is
absolutely no justification for Hartley's view, and his attempt to redefine the
term "God" so that "at least two hyponyms simultaneously occupy it (Father and
Word)" is merely the result of his circular reasoning and a priori assumptions
about the Father and the Word. He manipulates the term "God" so that the two may
"simultaneously occupy it," though he seems confused about the fact that John
does not say the Word was with "God the Father," but with "God."
RESPONSE
Stafford is patently dishonest here. Even he admits that the TON THEON in John
1:1a refers to the Father (JWD, 220and the Father is a person, a fact he also
admits. But here he pretends to forget what he admits in his desire to make God
the Father (TON THEON) separate from His own nature (THEOS) which is
simultaneously applied to the Word. It is he who manipulates the term THEOS to
be other than God. He must assume personal distinction warrants ontological an
Arian axiom to be sure. Personal distinction simply demands plurality of persons
within THEOS. The purely qualitative sense to THEOS incorporates both the Father
and the Word. But his own translation must assume several dubious stages of
morphing the text unwarranted by normal hermeneutical measures. The fact that
THEOS is used in a qualitative fashion and thus meant to encompass its hyponyms
(Father and Word) no more makes God a category than applying human as a category
of people warrants the accusation of turning people into categories. Words are
symbols used to refer to Stafford hopelessly confuses the two. Even the word
"God" is a symbol, not God Himself. It can be used to refer to God in a direct
personal way or used to depict God's characteristics much like the Greek noun
ANTHROPOS can be used to refer to a person or human attributes and Spirit can be
used to refer to attributes of God alone. It is not an either-or here but a
both-and. Stafford, however, appears to be a prisoner of his own self-made
disjunctions.
STAFFORD
So, at most, even if we allowed Hartley to read later theology into the text, he
would have to say that the God with whom Jesus existed is 'simultaneously
occupied' by the Father and the Holy Spirit, but not the Word, since, according
to them, there is only one God in a positive sense, and Jesus is 'with' that
God. Instead they pull a fast one and substitute the 'personal' term 'Father'
for hO THEOS and proceed to interpret the text according to post-biblical
distinctions. It is evident that Hartley will say whatever he has to in an
attempt to fit the square block into the round hole. Again, trinitarians are
forced to create distinctions and definitions that are foreign to Scripture in
order to support their preferred theology.
RESPONSE
How could God be occupied with the Father and Jesus but not the Word? Stafford
appears prone to strawman my position to make his setting it aflame burn
brighter. Let me state it clearly. God the Son was eternally with God the Father
and God the Spirit. These existed eternally in personal distinction as the one
God. Each can be called God without impugning on the unity of the Godhead or
demanding that there are three gods or one God and lesser gods. As for his
comment that my view states that God is "simultaneously occupied" by the Father
and the Holy Spirit he again misrepresents my view. I am speaking linguistically
in relation to hyponyms and superordinates. He jumps over these linguistic
categories and assumes a direct correspondence between language and reality. I
am simply noting what the linguistic data states in linguistic terminology. To
say that God is occupied with individuals is simply a straw man. God consists of
three divine Persons who! ! are the one God.
It is question-begging on Stafford's part to insist I am reading later theology
into the text. I am simply reading the text as it is presented to me guided by
the grammatical facts derived from John himself. Historically it is Arianism
that came later and this is the theology that is forced into the text at every
turn by Stafford.
Finally, let me give an example that might prove illuminating to the preceding
discussion. We have noted that SARX is a mass noun. In Ephesians 5:31 it states
concerning marriage "And the two will become one flesh" (SARX). Now the question
is, How would lexical tagging and semantic signaling read this text? Are the two
human beings in marriage to become one human being? Or become a human being? Or
a man? Is the fact that they are "one" in any way diminish the existence of
their separate personalities? Or demand that they cannot be one flesh? Or must
we assume they are strictly one in every sense? Or could one get away with
equivocating "flesh" to denote different meanings to each individual?
All of these propositions are preposterous. Here we have two individuals that
are united as one in a sense other than persons while maintaining this
distinction. These two persons will be one flesh. It certainly doesn't mean they
are one being, but the point is they are united here in a sense defined by the
PN (SARX). They are not two fleshes but one flesh. Semantically they occupy as
co-hyponyms in contiguitous relationship to the superordinate SARX. Now if this
can be said about two persons in marriage without demanding equivocation, two
fleshes, some indefinite sense, or some tertium quid, why cannot Stafford
understand this type of relationship to the Father and Word as demonstrated by
the grammar of John 1:1 without engaging in dubious tactics of argumentation?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.
"Revisiting the Colwell Construction in Light of Mass/Count Nouns" by
Donald E. Hartley Th.M, Ph.D (student), Dallas Theological Seminary.
2. Don Hartley's Misunderstanding of My View of Qualitative Nouns and P. B.
Harners JBL Article By Greg Stafford
3. Hartley responds with "Hartley's Second Response To Stafford" on May
25, 1999.
4. Partial Response to Hartley, By Stafford: 5/25/99
5. Another Response to Stafford - 5/25/99 (third)
6. Greg Stafford on 5/26/99 says: "Hartley's theory, regardless of what he
tells you, is hopelessly without substantiation, as I will explain shortly."
7. Greg Stafford to Hartley on 5/26/99: "Please cite an example of a
singular count noun in the precopulative position, that CANNOT be indefinitized."
in Clarity, Please...
8. Specifically...I would like Hartley to list the 19 Q-class nouns to
which he refers on page 65 of his thesis (par. 2, line 5), for our
consideration.
9. Greg Stafford on 6/3/99: Surrejoinder to Don Hartley: Q-Class Count
Nouns , John 1:1c, and Other Related Matters